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Discovery by the Defendant
IT is an often-cited proposition that at common law the defendant
in a criminal trial had no right to discover any of the prosecution's
case against him. The earliest case on the point appears to be Rex v.
Holland,1 where the good justices were shocked that such an argu-
ment should be made. Defendant, an East India Company official
charged with corruption, sought to obtain a copy of a report of a
board of inquiry, which report contained the testimony of a number
of potential witnesses in India. The only alternative was to seek
out their testimony himself, which was inconvenient to say the least.
Lord Chief Justice Kenyon noted that to grant the request would be
to "subvert the whole system of the criminal law,' 2 Grose, J., adding:
"It is clear that neither at common law, or under any of the statutes,
is the defendant entitled as a matter of right to have his application
granted. And if we were to assume a discretionary power of granting
this request, it would be dangerous in the extreme and totally un-
founded on precedent."3
Not entirely consistent with the suggestion above that the com-
mon law courts had not the power to grant discovery were two later
cases, Rex v. Harrie4 and Regina v. Spry.5 In each of these cases,
discovery of the instrument of crime was allowed. In Harrie, the
item was a letter in which the defendant had allegedly threatened
another; in Spry, the contents of a poison-murder victim's stomach
were allowed to be examined pretrial by the defendant. 6
*Member, California Bar.
1 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792). The earlier case of Rex v. Purnell,
95 Eng. Rep. 595 (K.B. 1748), cited by Buller, J. in Rex v. Holland, did not
deal with the present question, but instead dealt with the prosecutor's right
to compel disclosure from Oxford College, of which defendant was a vice-
chancellor.
2 100 Eng. Rep. at 1249.
3 Id. at 1250.
4 172 Eng. Rep. 1165 (K.B. 1833).
5 3 Cox. Crhn. Cas. 221 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1848).
6 Technically Rex v. Holland is still good law in England today. Since
about 1840, however, its holding has become irrelevant by virtue of English
statutes requiring that the state present all its evidence at the preliminary
hearing, where defendant is present and may participate. Since the prose-
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Early American Law
American courts readily picked up the doctrine of Rex v. Holland,
to the effect that they were without power, absent legislation, to
order the prosecutor to divulge evidence which he had in his posses-
sion.7  An early exception to this was an opinion by Chief Justice
Marshall presiding at the celebrated trial of Aaron Burr. In United
States v. Burr,s the defense sought pretrial inspection of a letter
from General Wilkinson (the chief prosecution witness) to the Presi-
dent. In strong language of fundamental fairness and the right to
adequately confront witnesses, Marshall granted Burr's request, and
denied the government's motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum
directed to the President. Whatever the original force of this prece-
dent, it has been long since forgotten.9
By 1928 it was safe to say that there was a "general rule that the
accused has no right to the inspection or disclosure of evidence in
the possession of the prosecution."'1 In 1927, Chief Justice Cardozo,
writing a leading opinion in the area, People ex rel. Lemon v. Su-
preme Court,". granted a writ of prohibition against a trial judge's
order allowing broad discovery. Cardozo put the case on the narrow
ground that the materials sought to be discovered were not admissible
in evidence. 12  Referring to the court's power to grant discovery at
all, he noted that only the "beginnings or at least the glimmerings
of such a doctrine are to be found ... ."13 Some of these "glimmer-
ings" were the two English cases discussed above, which had allowed
discovery despite Rex v. Holland. Another was People v. Gerold,14
an Illinois case reversing the conviction of a defendant who had been
denied the opportunity to inspect his own books, which had been
earlier seized by the police. Cardozo might also have noted United
States v. Rich,5 an Alaska case affirming a lower court's granting
defendant the right to photograph what were allegedly his finger-
prints on a pane of glass, or State v. Tippett, 6 a Missouri case de-
cution probably cannot introduce evidence which it does not present at the
preliminary hearing, or of which it has not given notice to the defense, the
defendant has an adequate discovery mechanism, at least of the case against
him. P. DEVLIN, THE CRIINAL PROSECUTION ix ENGLAND 112-16 (1958).
7 See the early decisions cited in notes 23, 26, 28, 29, 76 infra.
8 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692) (C.C.N.D. Va. 1807).
9 Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure, 59
W. VA. L. REV. 221, 234 (1957).
10 Annot., 52 A.L.R. 207, 208 (1928).
11 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927).
12 Id. at 34, 156 N.E. at 87.
'3 Id. at 32, 156 N.E. at 86.
14 265 fll. 448, 107 N.E. 165 (1914).
15 6 Alaska 670 (1922).
16 317 Mo. 319, 296 S.W. 132 (1927). The case was shortly thereafter




cided the same year as Lemon, also affirming a lower court's grant
of discovery. These and other cases 17 went largely ignored, however,
and after Lemon it was nearly universally true that a court would
not order discovery or even affirm a trial court that did.
Current State Law
Sixteen states appear to adhere to the traditional view that the
trial courts are without power to allow discovery, in the absence of
legislation. They are Arkansas,'8 Colorado,' 9 Connecticut,
2 0 Georgia, 21
Kansas, 22 Kentucky,23 Indiana,24 Massachusetts, 25 Minnesota, 26 Mon-
tana,27 New Mexico,28 Ohio,29 Pennsylvania,3" Texas,3 1 Utah32 and
17 See United States v. Riviera, 10 P.R.R. 186 (1917) ("It would seem
that there must in a clear case be such power [to compel discovery] in the
court."); In re Greenbaum, 249 F. 468 (6th Cir. 1918).
Is Watts v. State, 222 Ark. 427, 429 n.2, 261 S.W.2d 402, 403 n.2 (1953)
(citation of Lemon in dictum).
19 Walker v. People, 126 Colo. 135, 141, 248 P.2d 287, 302 (1952): "The
doctrine of discovery is . . . a complete and utter stranger to criminal pro-
cedure, unless introduced by appropriate legislation." Wooley v. People, 148
Colo. 392, 367 P.2d 903 (1961); Mendelsohn v. People, 143 Colo. 397, 353 P.2d
587 (1960).
20 State v. Trumbell, 23 Conn. Supp. 41, 176 A.2d 887 (1961). But see
State v. Cocheco, 24 Conn. Supp. 377, 190 A.2d 916 (1963), which suggests that
it is in the trial judge's "sound discretion," although the denial of discovery
was affirmed with some elaboration by the court as to the general undesir-
ability of criminal discovery.
21 Blevins v. State, 220 Ga. 720, 141 S.E.2d 426 (1965); Walker v. State,
215 Ga. 128, 109 S.E.2d 748 (1959).
22 State v. Furthmeyer, 128 Kan. 317, 277 P. 1019 (1929).
23 Kinder v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1955); Wendling v.
Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 587, 137 S.W. 205 (1911). But see Arthur v. Com-
monwealth, 307 S.W.2d 182 (Ky. 1957) (reversible error not to allow the ac-
cused to inspect his prior statements at trial).
24 Lander v. State, 238 Ind. 680, 154 N.E.2d 507 (1958).
25 Commonwealth v. Chapin, 333 Mass. 610, 132 N.E.2d 404 (1956), where
the court held that it was settled that the defendant is not entitled to a copy
of a confession. But see Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 209 N.E.2d
308 (1965), which held that opportunity for the defendant to interview the
state's witnesses was required by article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights.
20 State ex rel. Robertson v. Steele, 117 Minn. 384, 135 N.W. 1128 (1912).
27 State ex rel. Keast v. District Court, 135 Mont. 545, 342 P.2d 1071
(1959).
28 Territory v. McFarlane, 7 N.M. 421, 37 P. 1111 (1894).
29 State v. Yeoman, 112 Ohio St. 214, 147 N.E. 3 (1925); State v. Rhoads,
81 Ohio St. 397, 91 N.E. 186 (1910); State v. Potts, 69 Ohio-L. Abs. 77, 124
N.E.2d 180 (Ct. App. 1953). The language of State v. Corkran, 3 Ohio St. 2d
125, 209 N.E.2d 437 (1965), might be used to suggest discretion in the trial
court.
30 Commonwealth v. Caplan, 411 Pa. 563, 192 A.2d 894 (1963). The court
refused to prohibit discovery granted the defendant below, but only because
mandamus rather than prohibition was sought by the state on appeal. Prior
to this decision it might have been thought that the host of lower court cases
that had held themselves to be without power to grant discovery (e.g., Corn-
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Wisconsin.3 3  Since some of the precedents are old, one cannot tell
with certainty whether trial judges still regard them as binding. Also,
since many of these cases were appealed from a trial judge's denial of
discovery, it is somewhat subjective on the author's part to distinguish
those courts which flatly refuse to recognize any power in the court to
grant discovery from those which merely affirm the trial judge's
discretion not to grant it.
In almost all other states, discovery is in the discretion of the
trial judge. The term "discretion" covers a wide variety of view-
points, however. (1) It can mean that presumptively discovery ought
not to be granted to a defendant, unless he can show some special
need for particular items.34 This comes very close to saying that
there shall be no discovery at all, since the defendant often will not
know exactly what it is that he wants, or in what way, if any, it
might prove useful to him. 5 (2) Discretion nay be of a "neutral"
variety, the neutrality being that of the appellate court. Very great
weight is here given to the trial judge's decision in granting dis-
covery or denying it. 36  (3) Finally, some states have a presumption
in favor of granting discovery, withholding it only upon a showing by
the prosecution that some particular evil needs to be averted. Cal-
ifornia is undoubtedly the foremost example of this kind of "discre-
tion."37
monwealth v. Zayac, 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 646 (Dist. Ct. 1954)) had been overruled
by In re Di Joseph, 394 Pa. 19, 145 A.2d 187 (1958), which had affirmed an
order permitting discovery of a murder weapon.
31 Dowling v. State, 167 Tex. Crim. 43, 317 S.W.2d 533, cert. denied, 358
U.S. 886 (1958).
32 State v. Lack, 118 Utah 128, 221 P.2d 852 (1950) (refusal of discovery
was held not to be an "abuse of discretion," citing Lemon and other cases
holding that a court was without power to order discovery).
33 State v. Circuit Court, 16 Wis. 2d 197, 114 N.W.2d 114 (1962).
84 See, e.g., State v. Spica, 389 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1965); Application of
Killion, 388 P.2d 168 (Okla. 1959); State v. Di Noi, 59 R.I. 348, 195 A. 497
(1937).
35 In some states this rule of discretion is equivalent to outright prohibi-
tion, because the trial judges have never authorized inspection and apparently
will never do so until they are given statutory or appellate direction. Krantz,
Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases: A Necessity for Fair and Impartial
Justice, 42 NEB. L. Rnv. 127, 146-47 (1963).
36 See, e.g., Glaros v. State, 223 Md. 272, 164 A.2d 461 (1960), where
despite the existence of vID. AwN. CODE, RuLEs or P. 728 (1957), which allows
discovery, the appellate court affirmed denial as in the discretion of the trial
judge; State v. Thompson, 54 Wash. 2d 100, 338 P.2d 319 (1959), where the
court lists a number of factors to guide the discretionary decisions. Michigan
may also be placed in this category. People v. Johnson, 356 Mich. 619, 97
N.W.2d 739 (1959). For a discussion of the "neutral" position, see Comment,
Five Years Under State v. Thompson: Criminal Pre-Trial Discovery in Wash-
ington, 39 WAsiL L. REv. 853 (1965).
37 The numerous California cases reversing trial judges for refusing to
:grant defendants' motions for discovery are collected in Murphy, Criminal
Discovery: What Progress Since U.S. v. Aaron Burr, 2 CR=w. L. BuLL., No. 5,
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CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
A third position taken by some states through legislation or
constitutional pronouncement is that the defendant has an absolute
right to discover at least parts of the prosecutor's case against him.
Florida,38 illinois,39 and Tennessee40 have all enacted statutes mak-
ing mandatory pretrial disclosure to an accused of his confession or
any admission against interest. Louisiana has reached the same re-
sult by interpreting unspecified portions of the state and federal
constitutions to require pretrial discovery of a written confession.41
Seven other states also have discovery statutes or rules, but all of
these are framed in terms of the trial judge's discretion, and thus
belong in one of the discretionary categories above.
42
Current Federal Law
Until recently, discovery by criminal defendants in federal courts
was also nearly nonexistent, the courts adopting the common law
1966, at 3. The early California cases are discussed in Fletcher, Pretrial Dis-
covery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STrx. L. REv. 293' (1960); see note 125 infra.
New Jersey should also be placed in this category. Since the abandonment
of Chief Justice Vanderbilt's leading opinion in State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203,
98 A.2d 881 (1953), opinions following State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d
313 (1958), have indicated a liberal presumption in favor of discovery. The
New Jersey discovery rule, N.J. Ct. R. 3:5-11 (1968), was very recently
amended to follow the 1966 amendments to FED. R. Cnm . P. 16. Reference
to the new rule is found in State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965).
38 FLA. STAT. § 925.05 (Supp. 1967). Discovery of items other than con-
fessions or admissions is discretionary with the trial judge, and governed by
FLA. STAT. § 909.18 (1963).
39 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-10 (1965); cf. People v. Shockey, 30 Ill. 2d
147, 195 N.E.2d 703 (1964).
40 TEN. CODE ANN. § 40-2441 (1963).
41 State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So. 2d 273 (1945). The tenor of Louis-
iana decisions since Dorsey makes it unmistakably clear that nothing other
than written confessions are discoverable. State v. Pallet, 246 La. 483, 165
So. 2d 294 (1964); State v. Di Vincenti, 225 La. 689, 73 So. 2d 806 (1954);
State v. Haddad, 221 La. 337, 59 So. 2d 411 (1952). Moreover, any reference
to the Constitution is absent in State v. Simien, 248 La. 323, 178 So. 2d 266
(1965), which affirmed discovery of a written confession.
42 17 Amiz. R. Canm. P. 195 (1956). This is substantially the old federal
discovery rule 16; however, the trial courts are not limited by the categories
of materials covered by the rule, and may use their discretion to grant dis-
covery in situations not covered by the rule. State v. Wallace, 97 Ariz. 296,
399 P.2d 909 (1965). DEL. SUPER. CT. RuLEs R. 16 (Supp. 1964) (the new
federal rule 16, verbatim); ID-O CODE ANN. § R19-1530 (Supp. 1963); AID.
ANN. CODE, R.P. 728 (1957); Mo. R. CRnM. P. 25.195 (1965) (allows discretion-
ary discovery of confessions after denial of their discovery was affirmed in
State v. Aubuchon, 381 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1964)); N.J. CT. R. 3:5-11 (1968); VT.
STATS. ANN. tit. 13, § 6721 (1961) is the old federal rule 16, enacted in 1961
after the Vermont court held itself powerless to grant discovery absent legis-
lation. State v. Lavallee, 122 Vt. 75, 163 A.2d 856 (1960). Vermont trial
judges are currently held to have power to grant discovery only where the
rule authorizes it. State v. Anair, 123 Vt. 80, 181 A.2d 61 (1962).
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view that no discovery should ever be allowed.43 In 1946 the main
federal discovery rule, rule 16,44 was added to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 45 The limitations of the old rule have been ex-
tensively discussed elsewhere. 46 Briefly, the old rule required that
the material be "obtained from or [belong] to the defendant, or ob-
tained from others by seizure or by process." Thus scientific reports,
such as ballistics reports or blood tests, not being seized from anyone
and not belonging to the defendant, were held nondiscoverable under
the rule.47 Also, the rule limited items discoverable to "books, papers,
documents, or tangible objects." The courts by and large construed
this provision to preclude discovery of a defendant's confession or
other statement made to the police.48 The rule further required that
before discovery should be granted, the defendant must show "that
the items sought may be material to the preparation of his defense."
Such a showing, except for lengthy and complex documents, was not
made by the defense attorney's mere allegation that the particular
item was necessary.4
9
Rule 16 was substantially altered by amendment in July 1966.
These changes eliminate most of the limitations discussed above: con-
fessions are explicitly obtainable,50 as are scientific reports,5 ' without
any showing of materiality or reasonableness. Some such showing
still has to be made with regard to discovery of "other books, papers,
43 E.g., Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646
(S.D.N.Y. 1923); see Fontana, Discovery in Criminal Cases-A Survey of the
Proposed Rule Changes, 25 MI. L. REv. 212, 214 (1965). But see note 17 supra.
44 Rule 16 has been the main discovery mechanism for defendants. How-
ever, for certain items other rules may be relevant: under rule 6 (e) discovery
of grand jury minutes should be allowed if defendant's "particularized need"
outweighs the traditional policy of secrecy. United States v. Proctor & Gamble
Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S.
395 (1959). Under rule 7(f) the prosecution may be directed to file a bill
of particulars, which has even been construed by one court to allow discovery
of government documents. United States v. Tellier, 19 F.R.D. 164 (E.D.N.Y.
1956); the 1966 amendments eliminate the "for cause" limitation of the old
rule. Under rule 17(c) a subpoena duces tecum may be used to obtain ma-
terial in possession of the government as long as it is admissible into evidence.
Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 219 (1951) (dictum).
45 Fed. R. Crim. P. 16.
46 E.g., Fontana, supra note 43, at 214; Krantz, Pretrial Discovery in
Criminal Cases: A Necessity for Fair and Impartial Justice, 42 NEB. L. REv.
127 (1963); Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure,
59 W. VA. L. REv. 221 (1957); Comment, Developments in the Law-Discovery,
74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 1051-63 (1961). Cases under the old rule are collected
in Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 819 (1966).
47 E.g., United States v. Telles, 226 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
48 E.g., United States v. Murray, 297 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 828 (1962).
49 United States v. Smith, 209 F. Supp. 907 (E.D. Ill. 1962).
50 FED. R. CRnw. P. 16 (a) (1).
51 FED. R. CPam. P. 16(a) (2).
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documents, tangible objects, or places," governed by rule 16(b) .52
Discovery orders for both items under 16(a) and those under 16(b)
are still quite clearly in the trial judge's discretion.53 However, the
general tenor of the increased liberality of the new rule, as well as
the specific authorization to refuse discovery if the prosecution shows
a potential for abuse to be found in 16(e), argue that the new rule
presumptively grants a right of discovery to defendants, similar to
the "right" given defendants in the California courts.54 This is
particularly true of confessions, scientific reports, and defendant's own
grand jury testimony, all discoverable under 16(a) without a show-
ing of materiality or reasonableness.
Desirability of Extensive Discovery Rights
With approximately one-third of American jurisdictions allowing
no pretrial discovery in criminal cases, and with a good proportion
of the remainder allowing it only insofar as trial judges may be dis-
posed to grant what traditionally they have rarely granted, the
question presents itself as to why discovery has been of such limited
acceptance in criminal trials. The argument for broad discovery
rights is quite simple: the ascertainment of truth-the primary pur-
pose of criminal trials-is best achieved by well-informed counsel, not
by the surprise tactics of the sporting theory of justice. Counsel
can be well-informed only if they know all the materials relevant to
the case, which includes those in their opponents' files. Indeed,
the more innocent the defendant, the more ignorant he will be of the
case against him, and the more his counsel will need discovery pre-
trial to obtain that information. Analogous reasoning led Ameri-
can jurisdictions long ago to adopt discovery rules for civil cases.
Why should not those same concepts apply when the personal stakes
are even higher?55 The answers given by courts and commentators
are numerous.
52 FED. R. CRni. P. 16(b).
53 Both rule 16 (a) and 16 (b) direct that the court may order ... " (em-
phasis added).
54 See note 37 supra.
55 Much lengthier versions of this argument may be found: Brennan, The
Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q.
279; Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-in Search of a Standard, 1964 Dunn
L.J. 477; Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. Rnv.
293 (1960); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960); Krantz, Pretrial Discovery in
Criminal Cases: A Necessity for Fair and Impartial Justice, 42 NEB. L. REV. 127(1963); Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CATi F.
L. REV. 56 (1961); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery,
39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228 (1964); Note, Pre-Trial Discovery in Criminal Proceed-'
ings, 27 BROOKLYN L. REV. 318 (1961); Developments in the Law-Discovery,
74 HARv. L. REV. 940, 1051 (1960).
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(1) A Defendant Who Knows All the Materials in the Case Against
Him Will Fabricate Defenses to Fit the Opportunities Made Evident
by that Knowledge.
The argument is that knowledge by a criminal defendant of the
entire case against him gives him confidence in any defenses he might
be willing to fabricate, because he knows that if he selects the right
one, there is no evidence in the hands. of the prosecution to contra-
dict it.6 The answers given this argument have been threefold. First,
our experience with civil discovery supplies a "complete rebuttal" of
"that old hobgoblin, perjury."5" After all, it is argued, prior to the
adoption of liberalized discovery rules for civil cases, fears of perjury
were expressed that have since proven unfounded. This ignores
the fact that a criminal defendant 'has more at stake than a civil
defendant, and would probably be more willing to commit the addi-
tional crime of perjury. Also, in civil cases both sides may discover
pretrial the opponent's case, thus being able to "pin down" that
opponent's story; in criminal, cases, however, the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination arguably prevents discovery
against the defendant to some extent,58 leaving the defendant free
to make his defenses "fairly or foully" as so worried Judge Learned
Hand.59
Second, it has been urged that the BritiSh experience in a criminal
procedure system which requires complete- disclosure pretrial of the
pkoeccution's case,60 has not borne out the fears of any substantial
increase in perjured defenses. The late Chief Justice Vanderbilt of
the'New Jersey Supreme Court purported to dismiss that contention
by disceining differences in national character between ourselves and
the English, the latter being more law-abiding and thus less likely
to perjure themselves. 6' Such generalizations seem unconvincing.
A better answer might be that one simply cannot tell how much the
56 Chief Justice Vanderbilt stated this argument in the leading case of
State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953): "In criminal proceedings long
experience has taught the courts that often discovery will lead not to honest
fact-finding, but on the contrary to perjury and the suppression of evidence.
Thus the criminal who is aware of the whole case against him will often
procure perjured testimony in order to set up a false defense .... ." Id. at
210, 98 A.2d at 884; accord, Commonwealth v. Caplan, 411 Pa. 563, 192 A.2d
894 (1963).
57 State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 227, 98 A.2d 881, 894 (1953) (dissenting
opinion of Brennan, J.). See also Brennan, supra note 55, at 291.
58 See section II beginning at text accompanying note 170 infra. At the
least the privilege undoubtedly protects the accused from having his deposi-
tion taken pretrial, which is. mainly what litigants in the civil arena can use
to pin down the other side.
59 United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
60 Note 6 supra.
61 State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 219, 98 A.2d 881, 889 (1953).
[Vol. 19
use of perjured defenses has increased with the increased liberality
of pretrial disclosure in England. Perjury is difficult to detect, and
even if detected, prosecution would be rare, because if the defendant
were found guilty of the crime for which he was originally charged,
there would be little incentive to prosecute him further; if he were
found innocent, the original fact-finder has implicitly said that he
was telling the truth. Hence, it is difficult to draw conclusions
either way from England's experience, although one does suspect
that its judicial system has not been subverted by allowing criminal
defendants to inspect the case against them.
Third, it is urged that whatever the inclinations of the crimirial
himself might be to fabricate defenses, his counsel, as an officer of
the court, will not cooperate in such deception, nor defend a client
that would.62 This argument has some force. Since many criminal
cases are handled by attorneys appearing infrequently in the crim-
inal arena,63 the standards of ethics governing their behavior in civil
cases would undoubtedly carry over to their criminal clients as well.
Nor would the majority of those lawyers specializing in criminal prac-
tice consciously allow such perjured testimony. The only exception
might be those attorneys customarily engaged by organized criminal
groups.
There is the possibility, however, that honest defense counsel
may unwittingly allow his client to fabricate a defense. That is, if
defense counsel, upon receipt of materials in the prosecution's files,
discloses the contents of those materials to the defendant before much
discussion has taken place between defendant and his attorney then a
fast-thinking defendant might fabricate a story without the attorney
having heard any prior, inconsistent version to arouse his suspicions.
Or, even if the defense attorney discloses the case against his client to
the latter well after the initial interviews, subsidiary defenses may
occur to the defendant once the state's case is made known to him,
defenses the factual bases of which had not been explored in the prior
interviews. Here again, defense counsel's suspicions would not be
aroused; and even if they were, in either of these situations, an at-
torney would have to be quite sure his client was not telling the
truth to abandon him because of his prejudgment of the accused's
veracity.
There are a number of questionable assumptions in the preced-
ing paragraph. First, initial interviews most likely will take place
before any discovery of the prosecution's case is made. Second,
many defendants probably do not possess the mental agility to make
62 Brennan, supra note 55, at 291-92.
63 Moore, The Right to Counsel for Indigents in Oregon, 44 ORx. L. REV.
255, 272-76 (1965).
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up a defense right on the spot. Third, there is no reason to believe
that the defense attorney will himself receive all the materials in
the prosecutor's file, or if he does, that he will reveal them all to the
accused; many of the materials would probably be relevant only to
counsel's own preparation, only some requiring explanation by the
defendant. At any rate, the defendant will have no reason to believe
he knows the entire case against him. Finally, if pretrial discovery
against the defendant is available,64 the prosecution will have ad-
vance notice of this defense so that it can investigate and be pre-
pared for any such perjury. To the extent a defendant knows this,
or is warned of it by the defense attorney, a sufficient deterrent is
probably created, for a completely rebutted defense is worse than
none at all.
The danger of perjured defenses, it seems to this author, is not
completely rebutted by the foregoing arguments. Some increase in
perjury will occur if broad discovery rights are extended to criminal
defendants. One must weigh this possibility, plus any considerations
developed later, against the desirability of having informed defense
counsel. And if one can isolate types of defendants, or classes of
materials sought to be discovered from which this danger is great-
est, perhaps discovery rights should vary accordingly.
(2) Prosecutors Customarily Open Their Files to Defense Counsel
Anyway, Refusing to do so Only if the Particular Attorney is not to
be Trusted to Use the Information Honestly.65
This contention is without merit. If its factual premise is true,
why should not the practice be formalized, and thus avoid what Mr.
Justice Brennan has termed the "constitutional overtones of denial of
equal protection" 66 implicit in it? If indeed some defense attorneys
will abuse the information given them, a trial judge would seem to
be a more appropriate adjudicator of that issue than the prosecutor's
office. 67
(3) Discovery of the Names of the State's Witnesses Will Lead to
Their Elimination or Intimidation.
[T]he criminal defendant who is informed of the names of all of theState's witnesses may take steps to bribe or frighten them into giving
perjured testimony, or into absenting themselves so that they are un-
64 See section II beginning at text accompanying note 170 infra.
65 This argument is set forth in a symposium, Pre-trial Discovery in
Criminal Cases, 31 BRooKLYN L. REv. 320, 329 (1965).66 Brennan, supra note 55, at 282.
67 As an argument against an absolute right to discovery, the idea hao




available to testify. Moreover, many witnesses, if they know that
the defendant will have knowledge of their names prior to trial, will
be reluctant to come forward with information during the investiga-
tion of crime .... 68
It deserves emphasis that this argument has relevance only to
discovery of witnesses' names before trial. It has no application to
discovery of any of a large number of potentially more important
items which do not contain those names. Hence as a general argu-
ment against discovery, it deserves no consideration.6 9
As an argument against discovery of witness lists, it has some
merit. While the number of cases of actual elimination of witnesses
may not be great,70 more subtle forms of persuasion perhaps would
be; most likely is the last fear mentioned by Chief Justice Vander-
bilt above-that potential government witnesses will not come for-
ward for fear of some adverse consequences. 71
It has been noted that a defendant in a prosecution for a federal
capital crime has a statutory right 72 to a list of the witnesses against
him, and that many state statutes require that the indictment con-
tain the names of the prosecution's witnesses used to support the
indictment.73 The empirical suggestion is thus possible that giving
this information to a defendant pretrial does not lead to the adverse
consequences imagined.74 However, this overlooks the highly lim-
ited nature of the federal experience (to capital crimes only). The
state experience is also inconclusive because the prosecution may
avoid the statutes' requirements in a number of ways: it may not
call certain witnesses before the grand jury in those instances where
it is able to obtain a true bill without them;75 or it may proceed by
information, not by presentment and indictment before the grand
jury.76 Even if the prosecution proceeds so that the statutes are ap-
plicable, the deliberate avoidance of the statutes by the prosecution
68 State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953).
69 State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 140, 145 A.2d 313, 317 (1958).
70 But see "Murder Witness Slain," The Boston Globe, Sept. 29, 1966, at
1, cols. 1-2.
71 Id. ("Stab Victim Won't Talk-Judge Puts Him In Jail").
72 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1964).
73 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 1851 (3d ed. 1940).
74 Fontana, supra note 43, at 217.
75 Wigmore notes that under the most common type of state statute,
witnesses not called before the grand jury and which are not listed before
trial are generally allowed to testify anyway. 6 J. WIGOmoRE, EViDENCE §
1852(b) (3d ed. 1940).
76 In People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16 (1963), the prosecution
apparently avoided CAL. PmN. CODE § 943, which required that the names of
witnesses called before the grand jury be inserted on the indictment. The
prosecution had proceeded by information, not by indictment, thus necessitat-
ing the later discovery motion by defense counsel, not based on the statute,
to obtain the names of the state's witnesses.
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does not often lead to exclusion of the testimony of unlisted wit-
nesses.7 7 Finally, measurement of how many witnesses have ab-
sented themselves due to bribery or coercion, or how many never
came forward in the first place, is nearly impossible.
(4) Defendants Would Alter or Destroy Physical Evidence if They
Were Given Access to it Pretrial.
This argument has much in common with number (3) above, ex-
cept that it is less convincing. First, for most items sought to be
discovered, there is no reason why defendant should have the origi-
nal. For taped interviews, confessions, experts' reports, witnesses'
statements and the like, a copy should be sufficient to allow the de-
fense attorney to prepare the case. Those items which cannot be
copied, such as a murder weapon, a fingerprint on a pane of glass, or
expended bullets, are at least susceptible of being photographed;
also, the state's tests could be made on these items before they are
transferred to the defendant's attorney. The same may be said of
those materials which the defendant may need in the original, such as
a tape recording to examine it for alterations and editing, or an
allegedly forged check to examine the signature closely. Some dupli-
cation can be made before the defendant is given the material, and
if that is not possible, the state can run its tests beforehand.
Second, the stated argument assumes that a physical transfer of
material is what is meant by pretrial inspection. For a large number
of items, inspection in the presence of the court clerk would be
enough, although it is true that for some items on which tests might
be desired, a physical transfer would prove necessary.
Third, defense counsel will be considerably more reluctant to
alter evidence than his client might be, and it is to the attorney, and
not to the defendant himself, that these materials would be given.
Certainly there would be no reason for defense counsel to entrust
the evidence to the defendant; thus the latter would have no oppor-
tunity to alter it outside the presence of his attorney.
Fourth, the inference to be drawn from destruction of evidence
should be a sufficient deterrent to discourage an accused from doing
so, even if the opportunity should present itself.
(5) Availability of Pretrial Discovery of the Prosecutor's Case Will
Encourage Defense Counsel to Refrain From Independent Investiga-
tion.78
This argument has some force as applied to a defense counsel's
77 People v. Lopez, 26 Cal. 112 (1864); see 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIENCE §§
1851-3 (3d ed. 1940).
78 Note, Pre-Trial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 BROOxLYN L. REV. 320
(1965).
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ability to obtain pretrial evidence favorable to his client from the
prosecutor. Such evidence might be psychiatrists' reports that- the
defendant is not sane, or ballistics reports that the defendant's gun
was not the murder weapon. Simply knowing that the prosecutor
will have to yield up such evidence if he locates it may well encourage
the defendant's attorney to diminish his own efforts to obtain it
through independent investigation, particularly if that defendant is
indigent and the investigation costs must come from the attorney's
own pocket.79 However, disclosure of exculpatory material has long
been held to be constitutionally required of a prosecutor.80 The
discovery about which this discussion has been revolving is of ma-
terials upon which the prosecutor intends to construct his case, which
will almost by definition be damning and not exculpatory of the
accused. And pretrial discovery of these unfavorable materials would
seem to work just the opposite result than that predicted above: it
would be easier for defense counsel to prepare to meet the case
against his client once he knows the chief constituents of that case,
and thus he will be more likely to conceive and investigate lines of
defense suggested by that foreknowledge.
It is of course quite possible that some defense attorneys would
not investigate potential defenses, even though that task was made
easier by pretrial discovery, but would instead satisfy whatever feel-
ings of duty they might have to defend their client by rebuttal of
the prosecutor's case alone. Such attorneys, in other words, would
perhaps feel that a well-prepared rebuttal would present a suffi-
ciently competent appearance in court that they need do nothing
further. This might be particularly true of appointed counsel.
An example of such behavior is to be found in Ashley v. Texas,81
where the defense counsel obtained pretrial inspection of two of the
state's psychiatrists' reports. These reports, in agreement with that
of a private psychiatrist, had indicated that the defendant was sane.
Concluding that the reports were probably correct, defense counsel
failed to investigate further into the matter, and did not raise the
defense of insanity at trial.8 2 In Ashley itself, the fact that the prose-
cutor failed to disclose that other psychiatrists' reports had indi-
cated that the defendant was legally insane necessitated a remand
79 See Moore, supra note 63, at 270-72.
80 Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963) (psychiatrist's reports);
Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964) (ballistics reports). See gen-
erally text accompanying notes 154-64 infra. In extreme cases, a new trial
might be constitutionally required on the separate ground of inadequate coun-
sel because of failure to investigate, irrespective of any nondisclosure by the
prosecutor.
81 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963).
82 Id. at 81-82.
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for a new trial;8 3 absent the nondisclosure by the prosecutor, how-
ever, Ashley's conviction would doubtlessly have withstood any at-
tack on grounds of incompetent defense counsel .
4
Whether instances of this nature would occur more frequently
than would those where discovery leads to further investigation, is
open to question; the answer depends on one's evaluation of the con-
science of defense attorneys. To the author, it would seem that more
attorneys would be encouraged to investigate than would be dis-
couraged from doing so by allowing them the opportunity to inspect
the prosecution's case.
(6) An Overbalance of Advantages Favoring the Defendant Will Re-
sult if He Is Given the Additional Benefit of Knowing the Case
Against Him.
This argument appears to have been a favorite of courts in re-
fusing discovery to criminal defendants. Judge Learned Hand gave
the argument one of its more vehement expressions:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage.
While our prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not dis-
close the barest outline of his defense. He is immune from question
or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is
at least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve jurors. Why
in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence against him
to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense fairly or foully, I
have never been able to see. . . . Our dangers do not lie in too little
tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been always haunted
by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream.
What we need to fear is the archaic formalism and watery sentiment
that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime.8 5
The reply to Hand and others has often been that imbalance of ad-
vantage in criminal trials is not a relevant argument, for it assumes a
sporting theory of justice where each combatant must step into the
ring equally armed-an assumption long outdated by the modern view
of a criminal trial as a mutual search for truth.86 That reply simply
is not adequate. If in fact discovery must be by the defendant alone,
and if defense counsel, by knowing the prosecutor's case, can effec-
tively surprise him, it is a relevant argument that more guilty crimi-
nals will be freed than would otherwise be the case without dis-
83 Id. at 85.
84 While reversals for incompetent defense counsel are rare, the begin-
nings of such a rule may be found. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967); and State v. Bouse, 199 Ore. 676, 264 P.2d 800 (1953).
85 United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); accord, State
v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397, 425, 91 N.E. 186, 192 (1910): "Neither the sublime
teachings of the Golden Rule to which we have been referred, nor the sup-
posed sense of fair play, can be so perverted as to sanction the demands al-
lowed in this case." State v. Payne, 10 Wash. 545, 39 P. 157 (1895).
88 See Brennan, supra note 55.
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covery. There are, however, two replies which do negate the "one-
way street" argument stated above.
The first is that criminal discovery can and should be a "two-
way street." If both sides can discover the other's case, no one will
be surprised. To be sure, to some extent, discovery against the ac-
cused may violate his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation; but the mechanism of a conditional discovery order would
seem to allow almost complete discovery,87 thus obviating any objec-
tion about unfair advantage. Second, even without formal court-
ordered discovery being made available to the prosecutor's office, the
latter can learn a good deal about the defendant's case through its
early knowledge of the crime, its elaborate investigative apparatus,
and its opportunity, recently restricted,88 to interrogate the accused
if he waives his right to remain silent. Thus the state does not seem
ill-equipped to deal with surprise tactics by the defendant.8 9 In an
extreme case, a continuance coupled with rapid investigation might
be necessary.9 0
(7) Discovery Will Exempt Some Criminals From Prosecution.
A district attorney's office investigating large-scale criminal or-
ganizations will invariably come across numbers of subordinate per-
sonnel in those organizations who should be prosecuted for their par-
ticipation in the criminal enterprise. In view of the applicable stat-
utes of limitations and because of the necessary length of time such
large-scale investigations may require, prosecution of these individuals
often cannot wait until charges are brought against the entire or-
ganization. However, it is argued, if discovery of the prosecution's
case is available to these lower echelon criminals, then the district
attorney will be deterred from prosecuting them at all for fear that
they will be able, through the exercise of broad discovery rights, to
expose many of the current leads to their superiors in these organiza-
tions.
This argument has a very limited applicability. Conceivably in
the situation described, discovery could operate to deter prosecutions,
although even there it must be remembered that the trial of these
lower echelon criminals may necessitate exposure of current leads,
and thus prosecution of these people might be deterred without dis-
covery. But, in any event, as an argument against extending dis-
covery in a very particular set of circumstances, it has some merit;
as an argument against extending discovery rights generally, it has
very little.
87 See text accompanying notes 234-65 infra.
88 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966).
89 Goldstein, supra note 55.
90 See Traynor, supra note 55, at 248.
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(8) The State Has a Proprietary Interest in Materials Prepared by
Its Own Personnel.
This contention is more implicit than explicit in the arguments
of the opponents of broadened discovery rights, probably because
when explicitly stated it seems so unjustifiable. Simply because state-
paid officials interview witnesses, make up reports, or conduct scien-
tific investigations is no reason to deny access to those materials to
defense counsel. The state should be attempting to secure just con-
victions, and not be in the business of collecting property. The
notion that the accused may not utilize the state's financial resources
to provide him with a defense if his own are inadequate has long since
been discarded: defendant's counsel may well be appointed and paid
by the state,91 and the state may be paying his subpoena costs9 2 or
the cost of a transcript for use on appeal.93
(9) If Discovery Were Allowed, Prosecutors Would Make Mate-
rials Nondiscoverable by Committing Them to Memory.
The thrust of this argument is not that the extension of discovery
rights to criminal defendants would accomplish little; rather, it is that
a prosecutor who attempts to memorize a good portion of his case
may, by faulty memory prejudice a defendant, or jeopardize a just
conviction he might otherwise have obtained. Such an argument is
equally applicable to the parties in civil litigation, and probably a
good deal of this commission to memory would go on were it not for
the "work product" limitation of Hickman v. Taylor.9 4 A similar
limitation would be needed in the area of criminal discovery to pro-
tect the prosecutor's own notes or interdepartmental memoranda.
But would one want to make all items that are susceptible to this
practice nondiscoverable? Many items could not be committed to
memory, such as confessions of the accused, physical evidence, pre-
trial statements of witnesses if impeachment is anticipated-in fact,
all evidence the prosecutor intends to produce at trial. On the other
hand, witness lists, recorded interviews with prospective witnesses,
police reports, and scientific reports when the expert will testify
without the use of the report, are all susceptible to this practice.
One would probably not want to extend a work product exemption
to these items, and so as to them the stated argument has some
merit. Perhaps the only answer to it is that given by Professor Loui-
91 Payment of appointed counsel was recently provided for in federal
courts. 78 Stat. 552 (1964). State courts have quite commonly been empow-
ered to pay counsel for indigents. See e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 133.625, 133.635,
135.320, 135.330 (1963).
92 FED. R. Canv. P. 17 (b).
93 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
94 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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sell,95 that prosecutors will simply have to be educated that such
adversary tactics are inappropriate.
In the opening paragraph of this section it was assumed that
extending discovery rights to criminal defendants was desirable. It
is submitted that the ensuing discussion has not altered the validity
of that assumption. Of those pitfalls and dangers enumerated above
that have any validity, almost all have limited applicability, limited
either to classes of criminals or to types of material sought to be
discovered. The question then becomes one of how the desirable
features of discovery-an adequately informed and prepared defense
counsel-can be achieved, while at the same time these harmful side
effects are minimized. In general terms this is the topic of the next
section, which deals with the legal basis and degree of elucida-
tion desirable in the granting of discovery rights.
Most Desirable Legal Basis for Discovery
Introduction
A number of positions have been noted as to the degree to which
discretion is left with the trial judge to grant or refuse discovery, and
as to the various legal bases-statute, court rule, or constitution-
for granting discovery rights. The basic problem here stems from
the fact that discretion in the trial judge is desirable so that he may
refuse to allow discovery where the abuses enumerated earlier seem
likely,9 6 and from the fact that trial judges have traditionally been
quite conservative in allowing discovery.9 7 Thus framing discovery
in broad terms as a matter of right may encourage all the evils the
95 Louisell, supra note 55, at 92.
96 See State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 75-76, 51 A.2d 647, 653 (1947), where
the following statement appears: "[Tjhe tendency in the courts of this
country is to permit discretion in the trial judge. The argument made against
any such discretion is based upon a fear that the State, which is charged -with
the prosecution of crime, may be hampered in its duty by the disclosure of
its evidence to those charged with offenses. Whatever merit that argument
has as applied to a situation where it is contended that the accused has a
right to inspect the evidence, it has no application, we think, to a situation
where the trial judge in each case and on each application, determines what
should be done in the interests of justice. There are cases where it would be
clearly unjust to deny such an application and, on the other hand, cases are
conceivable in which it might improperly hamper the prosecution to grant
such an application." See also the statement of Mir. Justice Brennan, infra
note 90.
97 See Krantz, supra note 35; Louisell, quoted infra note 128. See also
Comment, Five Years Under State v. Thompson: Criminal Pre-trial Discovery
in Washington, 39 WASH. L. REV. 853 (1964), where a survey was taken ofjudicial attitudes at the trial bench level toward discovery by criminal de-
fendants. Apparently, even in Washington, whose supreme court has recently
been liberal in its attitude toward pretrial discovery in criminal cases, some
reluctance remains in trial judges to grant discovery frequently. Id. at 864-68.
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opponents of broader discovery have advanced, and framing it in
terms of discretion may not give very many defendants the oppor-
tunity for pretrial inspection which is the primary goal. The prob-
lem is divided into two parts below: first, whether this right-discre-
tion dilemma can be solved by differentiation between particular
kinds of evidence or between certain classes of criminals; and second,
whether the broadening of criminal discovery rights ought to be left
to the legislature or the courts in their rule-making capacity, or if
these rights should be grounded in the Federal Constitution.
Right in the Defendant v. Discretion in the Trial Judge
As has been noted above, most of the objections to discovery
have a limited field of application.98 The most important variable
determining their applicability would seem to be the kinds of evi-
dence sought to be discovered;9 9 that is, certain kinds of evidence
may give rise to more of these dangers than others. Also varying
with the type of materials sought to be discovered is the usefulness
in preparation of defense counsel, who may need certain items more
than others. These two variables lead the author to suggest that
criminal defendants might be given the right to discover confessions
and certain physical evidence, while discovery of other items might
be left to the discretion of trial judges.
(1) Confessions
The necessity of being permitted to inspect and copy pretrial
the confession of an accused should require little elaboration. 00 As
Chief Justice Weintraub of the New Jersey court observed in allowing
discovery of a confession:
We must be mindful of the role of a confession. It frequently be-
comes the core of the State's case. It is not uncommon for the judi-
cial proceeding to become more of a review of what transpired at
headquarters than a trial of the basic criminal event itself.... When
a confession is given and issues surrounding it tend to displace the
criminal event as the focus of the trial, there should be like oppor-
tunity to get at the facts of the substituted issue.101
98 In this author's opinion, some of the arguments have no validity,
namely (2) (D.A. allows discovery anyway); (6) (discovery is one too many
advantages for accused persons); and (8) (the state has a proprietary interest
in the materials used to prosecute crime). Consequently, these are not con-
sidered in the analysis of specific types of materials sought to be discovered.
99 "The extent to which discovery should be allowed in particular cases
will present complex problems. There will be questions for the exercise of
sound discretion depending upon the particular materials of which discovery
is sought." Brennan, supra note 55, at 293-94,
100 See generally Inker & Oteri, Discovery in Criminal Cases, 50 MAss.
L.Q. 342 (1965).
01 State v, Johnson, 28 N.J. 133? 137, 145 A,2d 313 316 (1958),
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The "substituted issue" referred to is whether the confession was
voluntary, which now involves the question whether the police gave
the proper warnings and advice required by Miranda v. Arizona.10 2
Since a confession is almost certain to be conclusive in the jury's mind
if admitted, it is uniquely important to defense counsel to be allowed
to inspect and copy it pretrial in order to effectively argue its inad-
missibility.103
The dangers outlined earlier are largely absent when the item
of which discovery is sought is a confession. The district attorney
certainly is not going to commit it to memory, nor will disclosure
pretrial of the confession greatly encourage perjury, since the defend-
ant is more or less "pinned down" to a significant number of details,
among which is his admission of guilt. The danger of alteration
is also minimal since a copy is easily made. There can be no danger
to witnesses from this source. The encouragement of lax defense
counsel is somewhat less of a problem here because it is difficult to
imagine an attorney being satisfied in rebutting what is for the most
part a rather unrebuttable document; hence discovery would not fore-
close independent investigation of collateral defenses, such as an alibi,
because foreknowledge of the confession could not lull counsel into a
feeling of having satisfied his duty to his client. Finally, while it is
possible that a confession might contain many of the police's current
leads to higher-placed criminals, this danger is also minimal be-
cause discovery would be by the defendant, who should have no
incentive to show this particular document to others possibly impli-
cated by it.
For these reasons, a statute or court-made rule granting defend-
ants the right to inspect and copy their confession pretrial would
seem to be desirable. As noted earlier, three states, Florida, 0 4 Illi-
nois, °0 5 and Tennessee,'0 6 have enacted statutes granting defendants
102 384 U.S. 486 (1966).
103 It is possible that the contents of the confession will not always, or
even most of the time, prove relevant to its admissibility on the issue of
voluntariness. See State v. Hashimoto, 46 Hawaii 183, 377 P.2d 728 (1962).
Nevertheless, pretrial inspection may be equally necessary:
"This is so because the impact of the statement upon guilt may turn upon
how the facts are stated, or upon the absence of exculpatory facts which a
defendant may claim were revealed to the interrogator or would have been
revealed if the inquiry had been complete. In murder cases in which guilt
is not disputed, the manner of expression or the omission of palliative cir-
cumstances may have additional significance because of their influence upon
the jury's determination as to punishment. Or the confession may contain
prejudicial material which should be exscinded and as to which counsel
should not be required to make a hurried decision in the courtroom." State
v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 138, 145 A.2d 313, 316 (1958).
104 Note 38 supra.
105 Note 39 supra.
106 Note 40 supra,
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that limited right. The Louisiana court has created a similarly
limited right to inspect confessions only, grounding that right in un-
specified portions of the federal and state constitutions. 1 7 This
approach seems preferable to that of the new Federal Rules, which
leaves discovery of confessions in the trial judge's discretion, 08 be-
cause if the foregoing analysis is correct, there should be nothing
left for the trial judge to balance in individual cases.
(2) Physical Evidence or Documents Recording or Comprising the
Crime Charged.
Certain pieces of evidence may be of key importance because they
record the crime of which the defendant is charged.10 For example,
the accused forger may request discovery of the checks he is alleged
to have forged for a comparison of signatures; or an accused bank
robber, of the film recording his movements in the bank; or an em-
bezzler, of the allegedly altered books of account; or one who has
allegedly attempted to bribe an official, of a tape recording of the
conversation of that attempted bribery. These items, like a confes-
sion, can become virtually conclusive of the defendant's guilt if,
again using the same examples, the signatures are obviously the
same, the accused is clearly identifiable in the film of his robbery of
the bank, the alterations in the books are clearly the accused's, or
one of the voices on the tape is easily identifiable as the defendant's.
In effect, with the clarity depending upon the mode of preservation,
the jury is able through these pieces of evidence to observe the
defendant reenacting his crime.
Courts which ordinarily regard criminal discovery with a cautious
eye have allowed, or stated in dictum that they would allow, dis-
covery of these kinds of evidence because they may be so much the
focal point in the later criminal trial. Forty-one years after the
King's Bench observed that discovery "would be dangerous in the
extreme,""n 0 pretrial discovery of a threatening letter, when the
charge was threatening another through the mails, was granted,-"
107 Note 41 supra.
108 FED. R. Cnm . P. 16. The new rule does make some distinction between
confessions and certain other items discoverable under subsection (a), and
everything else discoverable under subsection (b). To obtain his confession,
an accused need not make "a showing of materiality to the preparation of
his defense and that the request is reasonable," as is otherwise required of
discovery motions under subsection (b). Also, discovery by the government
under subsection (c) may not be attached as a condition on discovery by
defendant of his confession, as it may be to discovery of almost anything
else. FED. R. CRlm. P. 16.
109 Steffes, Discovery in Criminal Cases, 10 PRAc. LAw., Oct. 1964, at 61, 68.
110 Rex v. Holland, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792).
111 Rex v. Harrie, 172 Eng. Rep. 1165 (K.B. 1833).
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One of the earlier California cases allowing discovery was Cash v.
Superior Court,112 in which a police officer posed as a co-conspirator
to a burglary and secretly taped the defendant's solicitation of a
third conspirator. In reversing defendant's conviction of solicitation,
the California Supreme Court held that denial of pretrial inspection
of the tape denied defendant a fair trial, noting that in these cir-
cumstances discovery of the tape was even more crucial to his de-
fense than discovery of a confession would have been. 1 3 The Ne-
braska and Oklahoma supreme courts, while refusing to order dis-
covery in the particular cases, noted that in the examples given
above, discovery would be allowed." 4
The dangers here, as in the discovery of confessions, would seem
to be minimal. Encouragement of lax defense counsel should not be
great because, like confessions, these materials may be nearly con-
clusive against a defendant; thus merely attempting to rebut such
evidence is not likely to satisfy the duty felt by defense counsel if
other avenues of independent investigation are open to him. The dis-
trict attorney cannot commit this evidence to memory, nor will its
discovery hamper his investigation of large-scale criminal organiza-
tions, since the evidence here sought to be discovered by definition
relates only to the crime charged. The danger of perjured defenses
exists with discovery of these items, although it is probably of lesser
magnitude than with discovery of other items such as witnesses' state-
ments. Discovery of this evidence creates the greatest incentive for
criminal defendants to alter or destroy it, since it is so damning,
but because these items for the most part can be copied, and because
the defendant or his attorney need not examine them outside the
presence of a court official, this is not a real danger. 1 5 Finally,
there will usually be no threat to witnesses by pretrial disclosure of
this information.
Because the need for discovery of these materials may be para-
mount, and because the dangers are somewhat less than for discovery
of other items, one might want to create a right in defendants to
discover these materials too. The major reason for not doing so,
aside from disagreement with the minimization of the dangers above,
would seem to be the elusiveness of the distinction between this kind
of physical evidence and all others. The policy of "paramount need"
112 53 Cal. 2d 72, 346 P.2d 407 (1959).
113 Id. at 75, 346 P.2d at 409.
114 Cramer v. State, 145 Neb. 88, 94, 15 N.W.2d 323, 327 (1944); Applica-
tion of Killion, 338 P.2d 168 (Okla. 1959). Arguably new FED. R. CPMvI. P.
16(a) (1) categorizes this type of evidence under "written or recorded state-
ments or confessions made by the defendant," thus entitling discovery of it
to the preferential treatment accorded motions for discovery of confessions
(referred to in note 108 supra).
115 See text accompanying notes 77-78 supra.
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will not always coincide exactly with whether the evidence records
the crime or not; a murder weapon may become the focal point of a
trial more than the books of account in an embezzlement case. Nev-
ertheless, this distinction can be drawn even if in admittedly gen-
eral terms, and, since the difference between a right to discover and
the kind of discretionary allowance of discovery recommended be-
low n1 6 is small, it should be made.
(3) Other Physical Evidence
The dangers of allowing discovery of physical evidence generally
are approximately the same as in allowing discovery of the particular
kind of physical evidence referred to above. Differences may exist in
that lax defense counsel are more encouraged in this more general
situation, bcause this evidence is not usually so conclusive against
a defendant; hence, defense counsel's conscience may not be pricked
by merely rebutting the prosecutor's case-in-chief and not pursuing
independent leads. Moreover, there is an increased likelihood that
the evidence will relate to current investigation of other members of
large-scale criminal organizations, since the evidence will not neces-
sarily relate only to the particular crime charged. For these reasons,
and because the need for discovery of these materials would usually
seem to be somewhat less than for discovery of confessions or of evi-
dence recording the crime, discovery here should be left to the trial
judge's discretion.
(4) Scientific Reports and Reports of Physical or Psychiatric Ex-
aminations of the Defendant
The necessity of defense counsel discovering these items would
seem to be somewhat less than that for discovery of physical evidence,
for if defense counsel has the physical evidence, he can conduct his
own tests on it. However, often for experts' reports of things like
semen analyses, blood tests, fingerprints, foot casts, or hair or skin
analyses, the physical evidence on which the test was made would
not exist, or if it does, might no longer be accurate for testing or
reproduction. And even if the evidence is suitable for retesting (such
as spent bullets for ballistics tests), there is the possibility that in
many locales there would be no experts or facilities available to com-
petently conduct such tests. This would not be true of examinations
of the defendant himself.
There is some danger of foreclosing independent investigation by
the defense attorney by allowing discovery of these items, for unlike
receipt of physical evidence, receipt of a report adverse to his client
116 See text accompanying notes 123-28 infra.
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may discourage the attorney from further investigation or examina-
tion by his own experts, as was the case in Ashley v. Texas.117 There
also exists some danger of perjured defenses being suggested by the
discovery of experts' statements, in that the defendant may fashion
his own testimony to make it as compatible as possible with an ex-
pert's conclusions. The danger is not as great here as when discovery
is allowed of pretrial statements generally because often the only
opportunity for successful perjury suggested by the statements would
require testimony of defendant's own expert, which is probably more
difficult to procure than, say, is the perjured testimony of an alibi
witness. No danger exists that the defendant would destroy these
statements, since he need only be given a copy; nor does it seem
likely that even the most powerful of defendants would intimidate or
bribe experts, whose opinion testimony could probably be replaced.
There is a remote possibility that experts' statements would relate
to other potential criminal defendants where, for example, a single
expert was consulted regarding several persons, or where his report
shows the existence of other persons connected with the same or addi-
tional crimes (e.g., a ballistics report showing the type of guns used
in addition to that of a defendant's). Because of these dangers, and
because the need for discovery of experts' statements is not para-
mount, discretion in the trial judge to refuse discovery of these ma-
terials would seem preferable to granting defendants an absolute
right to discover them.
(5) Witness Lists
Two factors here make it advisable that discovery be left to the
discretion of the trial judge: first, there is the danger that witnesses
may be coerced or bribed if their identity is made known before trial;
and second, there is the possibility that prosecution of large criminal
organizations will be hampered because informers will have to be
revealed prematurely.
(6) Pretrial Statements of Nonexpert Witnesses
Both fears mentioned with respect to discovery of witness lists
are relevant here to make it advisable to leave discovery of these
items to the discretion of the trial judge." 8 In addition, the need
for discovery is not as great here since the defendant's attorney
could himself interview or take depositions of some of the wit-
117 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963).
118 Congressional fears along these lines led to the enactment of the
Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964), which prohibits pretrial discovery of
witnesses' statements in the federal courts. See text accompanying notes
137-45 infra.
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nesses,119 and because the danger of perjured defenses is greatest here
in view of the fact that witness testimony is often the bulk of the
prosecution's case.
(7) Interdepartmental Memoranda: Investigator's Reports and the
Prosecutor's Notes
These items ought not to be discoverable at all, for several rea-
sons. While no doubt it would aid defense attorneys to have such
material pretrial, this is far less essential to the preparation of a
defense than discovery of the materials above discussed. In fact, if
defense counsel could obtain these internal documents of the prose-
cutor, then the danger that the former will be encouraged not to
engage in independent investigation looms very large. The possibility
of knowing in detail the prosecutor's strategy may quite readily lead
a defendant's attorney to believe that a highly effective rebuttal of
that case will be sufficient, and that other avenues of investigation
need not be pursued. There is also a very apparent danger here of
giving the prosecutor an incentive to commit as much as possible to
memory in order to avoid this discovery. 120
A "work product" exemption from discovery would thus seem to
be appropriate. The Federal Rules carve out the following exception:
Except . . . for results of scientific tests and of physical or mental
examinations of the accused, this rule does not authorize the discovery
or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal government
documents made by government agents in connection with the in-
vestigation or prosecution of the case .... .21
Police and other investigatory reports are clearly within this exemp-
tion. It should be noted that while the danger of these reports being
committed to memory does exist if their discovery were allowed, the
revelation of prosecutorial strategy would not be likely from such
a source. Hence one might make these reports discoverable, although
the lesser need for doing so plus the danger of memorization argu-
ably should preclude this result.
22
119 See, e.g., Mo. R. CRnw. P. 25.10; State v. Cox, 352 S.W.2d 665, 673 (Mo.
1961): "A defendant is entitled to take the depositions of witnesses in a crim-
inal case."
120 See People v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 190, 404 P.2d 209, 216, 45 Cal. Rptr.
729, 736 (1965), where police notes and tape recordings of interviews were
sought to be discovered by the defendant. The "officers' field notes had been
transcribed into integrated reports, the original notes and records were dis-
carded, and tapes erased, in accordance with the routine practices of the de-
partment," and thus discovery was impossible and held properly denied.
121 FED. R. CRnm. P. 16 (b).
122 Like witnesses' statements, discovery of investigators' reports was
given very low priority by trial judges surveyed in Washington. Comment,
Five Years Under State v. Thompson: Criminal Pre-trial Discovery in Wash-
ington, 39 WASH. L. REV. 853, 869 (1964).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19
As observed at the beginning of this article,123 "discretion" in
the trial judge to deny discovery can mean a wide variety of things in
different jurisdictions. To overcome any judicial resistance to exten-
sive discovery rights, the term should be used to mean that presump-
tively the accused ought to be accorded pretrial inspection of physical
evidence, scientific reports, witness lists, and pretrial statements of
witnesses. 124 Refusal to grant discovery of these materials should be
made only on a finding by the trial judge of a reasonable likelihood
of abuse of the privilege by defendant or his counsel. This kind of
discretion in the trial judge is approximately what has been deline-
ated by a series of California opinions,1 2 5 and is what is recom-
mended here.
There are two possible approaches to a statute or rule allowing
rebuttal of such a presumption. The first of these is that taken by
the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 1 26  The first sentence
of rule 16(e) provides:
Protective Orders. Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any
time order that the discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or
deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate.
The alternative to this very general authorization to deny discovery is
a legislative enumeration of the factors to be considered in denying
the discovery which presumptively should be granted, and then re-
quiring that denials of discovery be accompanied by a short opinion
giving the reasons therefore, thus making that order more easily re-
viewable along the statutory guidelines.
127
Of the two approaches, the latter seems preferable. 128  Given
123 Text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
124 As noted in text accompanying notes 100-16 supra, for confessions and
other statements of the accused, as well as for certain physical evidence, no
discretion ought to be left the trial judge.
126 Compare Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957);
Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423, 340 P.2d 593 (1959); Cash v. Superior
Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 346 P.2d 407 (1959); and People v. Estrada, 54 Cal. 2d
713, 355 P.2d 641, 7 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1960), where the presumption is gradually
laid down, with People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16 (1963), where it
was successfully rebutted.
126 It is open to question whether the new federal rule sets up any pre-
sumption in favor of discovery. If the rule was intended to create any such
presumption of regularly allowing discovery, subsections (a) and (b) should
read "the court shall order . . ." rather than "the court may order .... "
and then reliance placed upon the exception in (e) to take care of those cases
where dangers were thought to exist. See Wright, Proposed Changes in Fed-
eral Procedure, 35 F.R.D. 317, 327 (1964).
127 Fm. R. Cnmw. P. 16(e) only requires that the prosecutor's written
statement opposing discovery be included as part of the record in the case.
128 "Looked at realistically, instead of as a neat legal concept, 'discretion
of the trial judge' in the area of criminal discovery appears more clearly for
what it often is: an escape hatch from the rigors of formulating a reasonable
rule for a complex situation. Actually, discretion of the trial judge has been
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any reluctance at all by trial judges to grant discovery, the presump-
tion of its general appropriateness could be rendered meaningless
by denials on unstated and irrelevant grounds. 129  The danger of
this more particularized approach is of course that all the potential
abuses may not have been anticipated and provided for, and that a
court confronted with such new abuses would find itself powerless to
prevent them by denying discovery. To the degree to which there
exist such unanticipated abuses in the schematization that follows,
that argument has some force.
Three factors would seem to be relevant and susceptible to judi-
cial implementation. They are the character of defense counsel and
his connections with organized crime, the character and background
of the accused, and the possibility of hampering prosecution of other,
related crimes.
The first is designed to take cognizance of the danger of perjured
defenses and the alteration of documentary evidence. Professor Loui-
sell has observed that members of large criminal organizations and
the counsel customarily engaged by them have both the will and the
means to abuse discovery in either of these ways, or to intimidate or
bribe witnesses as well. Since pretrial discovery in the prosecution
of members of such organizations also presents the danger of interfer-
ing with investigation of the organization itself, he has suggested
that perhaps discovery should be barred altogether to these defend-
ants.130 Such a flat rule, however, would seem to present the kind of
"invidious distinction" condemned by the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment, 13' because it denies discovery to certain
pretty much the rule in criminal discovery for many years with the result
that in most jurisdictions there has been no such discovery." Louisell, supra
note 55, at 98. See also Wright, supra note 126.
129 See the hodgepodge of factors listed by the court in State v. Gilman,
63 Wash. 2d 7, 8, 385 P.2d 369, 371 (1963): "Judicial discretion to grant or
to deny the examination of the state's files in a criminal case is compounded
of many things, among which are: timeliness of the application; time and
opportunity of the defendant to prepare for trial; reactions and attitudes of
witnesses if interviewed before trial; indications of prior inconsistencies in
the testimony; surprise at the trial, which reasonable diligence in preparation
would not have avoided; reasonable opportunity for examination and exper-
iment by experts, consistent with the preservation of the evidence; a clear
showing of real danger to and concern for the personal safety of witnesses;
needless damage to reputation; financial inability of the defendant to obtain
technical and investigative aid; and any other considerations, the denial of
which shows an unfair deprivation or the granting of which supports the
ideal of substantive due process-all, of course, to be considered in keeping
with the responsibility of the trial judge to control the pace of the trial and
keep it moving at reasonable speed to its conclusion."
130 Louisell, supra note 55, at 100.
131 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), where sterilization as
a punishment for repeater larceny felons, but not for repeater embezzlement
felons, was held violative of equal protection. See also the remarks of Mr.
Justice Brennan, text accompanying note 66 supra.
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defendants because of suspected but unproven affiliations while it
allows discovery to all others unsuspected of such connections.
Consequently, it seems less open to attack to counteract these
two dangers-perjury and alteration of evidence-by explicitly direct-
ing the trial judge to assess these dangers in light of the particular
attorney requesting discovery.132 Assessment of the attorney rather
than the client has two purposes: (1) it relieves the trial judge of
the necessity of second-guessing each particular defendant to deter-
mine whether he might be the type who would fabricate defenses or
alter evidence; this would be a nearly impossible task, one which
would open the door to much judicial leeway to refuse discovery with-
out real justification; (2) and it is bound to make a trial judge more
hesitant to deny discovery on these grounds, since to do so he has to
label a member of the bar, rather than merely a criminal defendant,
somewhat suspect. Presumably the judge will know, or come to
know, attorneys who might be willing to engage in these abuses
better than he would know individual defendants. And since fabri-
cation of defenses or alteration of evidence for the most part re-
quire the cooperation of counsel, 133 placing the emphasis on counsel
rather than client should be an effective way of selecting out those
cases where the dangers really exist. 3 4
The second factor which the hypothetical statute or rule would
direct the trial judge to consider is the character and associations of
the accused and the crime for which he is charged, to determine
whether he represents any real danger to witnesses. 35 Since witness
132 Of course if one took the approach of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886), seriously-that a statute as administered may be invidious even
though fair on its face-then the same equal protection challenge might be
made. That is, by-and-large, even under this approach, it will be members
of criminal organizations who will be denied discovery.
133 See text accompanying notes 52-60, 71-72 supra.
134 Requiring that this assessment be made of defense counsel suggests
that another might also be required, namely, whether defense counsel is of
the inclination or capacity such that allowing discovery by him would prob-
ably discourage him from any independent investigation. Giving this kind
of discretion to a trial judge, however, seems inadvisable since he cannot dis-
tinguish those attorneys who would conduct investigation without discovery
but would not with it, from those who would not do any independent work
anyway. The former is a lazy attorney with a conscience, and the latter is
just a lazy attorney, and it is illusory to believe that a judge can tell them
apart.
135 This factor too is not free from constitutional challenge, for the stat-
ute or rule would require that defendants who are presumed to be innocent
of the crime charged may nonetheless be deprived of rights to prove their
innocence because they are suspected of presenting a danger to witnesses. The
analogy of bail is perhaps useful here. One can view pretrial freedom as
itself an aid in investigation for defendants, since so many more of them are
eventually acquitted if freed pretrial than are those who are not, a possible
inference being that this freedom pretrial allowed defendants themselves to
investigatq their cases. See the statistics collected by the Vera Foundation in
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removal or coercion does not require the cooperation of counsel, the
trial judge would have to assess this danger in light of his knowledge
of the defendant himself rather than of his counsel. Such assess-
ment could be made on the past record of the defendant, the gravity
of the crime charged, and the fears expressed by the witnesses them-
selves about their safety. Review of such a decision does not seem
impossible or even difficult.136
The final factor which should be listed is the danger of hampering
related prosecutions if discovery in the particular case is allowed.
If the government can show that the defendant's case is related to
its current investigations of other criminals, and if it is shown that
the particular evidence sought would prejudice that investigation if
disclosed, the trial judge should be directed to refuse or defer
discovery.
With apologies to the drafters of the new Federal Rules for some
of the phrasing, the statute that emerges from the above discussion
should look something like this:
Discovery by the Defendant
(a) Defendant's Statements; Documents Recording the Crime
Charged. Upon motion of a defendant or counsel the court shall order
the attorney for the government to deliver 137 to defendant's counsel,
or if defendant is without counsel, to the defendant, 38 a copy of any
written or recorded statements or confessions made by the defendant
its Manhattan Bail Project, summarized in Kennedy, The Department of Jus-
tice and the Indigent Accused, 47 J. Am. Jun. Soc'y 182, 184 (1964). Yet no
one attacks the state's right to hold those prisoners deemed too dangerous or
too likely not to appear at a high bail or without bail. The same kind of
considerations are involved in making these decisions as would be required
by the judge here.
136 See People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16 (1963), where a trial
judge's denial of discovery for danger to witnesses was affirmed on appeal.
The judge had taken evidence on the issue of danger to witnesses, refusing to
rely on the mere assertion of the prosecution that there was a danger.
137 It would seem desirable to have the government deliver to defendant
a copy of the materials rather than requiring the defendant to seek them out
from the district attorney as is required by the new federal rules (FED. R.
Cinn. P. 16) and in California, People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 135, 142-43, 364
P.2d 452, 454, 15 Cal. Rptr. 620, 622 (1961). This eliminates the possibility
of the prosecutor frustrating discovery by being out to lunch, sick, etc. See
Murphy, Criminal Discovery: What Progress Since United States v. Aaron
Burr?, 2 Cram. L. BULL. 3, 9 (1966). One would not want original evidence
to be delivered to the defendant or his counsel; and accordingly, should copy-
ing not be feasible, inspection in the presence of the attorney for the govern-
ment and, if desired, a court official is provided for. A similar procedure is
available where the defendant seeks to conduct tests upon the evidence.
1 138 While delivery to the defendant himself is undesirable, to penalize
him for not engaging counsel would probably be invalid. In any event, in
almost all cases the accused should be represented by counsel, and the rule
explicitly requires that he and not the defendant be given the materials.
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and relevant to the crime charged and a copy of any documents or
other evidence which record the criminal act for which defendant is
charged; provided that such statements, confessions, documents, or
other evidence are in the possession, custody, or control of the gov-
ernment. If the court determines that a copy of the evidence sought
to be discovered cannot be made, or if a defendant moves to inspect
or conduct tests upon the original, the court shall order the attorney
for the government to permit the defendant's counsel, or if he is
without counsel, the defendant, to inspect and test such original evi-
dence, under the supervision of an official appointed by the court for
this purpose.
(b) Other Physical Evidence; Reports of Examinations and Sci-
entific Tests; Witness Lists; Statements of Witnesses. Upon motion
of a defendant the court shall order the attorney for the government
to deliver to defendant's counsel, or if he is without counsel, to de-
fendant, a copy of any reports of physical or mental examinations of
the defendant or of scientific tests or experiments made in connection
with the particular case, a list of prospective government witnesses,
a copy of other books, papers, documents, tangible objects, places,
or other physical evidence not discoverable under (a), provided that
all such reports, lists, statements, or other evidence are relevant to
the crime charged and in the possession, custody or control of the gov-
ernment. If the court determines that a copy of the evidence sought
to be discovered cannot be made, or if the defendant moves to in-
spect or conduct tests upon the original, the court shall order the
attorney for the government to permit the defendant's counsel, or if
he is without counsel, the defendant, to inspect and test such original
evidence, under the supervision of an official appointed by the court
for this purpose.
(c) Internal Government Documents. Except for discovery al-
lowed in (a) and (b), this rule does not authorize the discovery or
inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal government docu-
ments made by government agents in the connection with the investi-
gation or prosecution of the case.
(d) Protective Orders. If the court finds a reasonable proba-
bility (1) that defense counsel will engage in, or condone defendant's
engaging in, abusive practices regarding the evidence discovered, or
(2) that witnesses would be coerced, intimidated, or bribed if dis-
covery of their names or statements were allowed, or (3) that the
government would be unduly hampered in its prosecution of other
criminals, the court may decline to grant such portions of defendant's
motion under (b) as give rise to such danger. An order made under
this section shall be accompanied by a short opinion stating the
grounds of the order, and shall be made a part of the record of the
case.
Discovery as a General Consiiutional Right
Perhaps it is somewhat of a loaded question to ask whether there
ought to be a general constitutional right to discovery in criminal
cases, but most probably if fourteenth amendment due process is
held to encompass discovery rights, it will be done in a broad fashion
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rather than on a case-by-case determination of prejudice. The Frank-
furter view of due process requiring reversal in criminal cases only
when "the whole course of the proceedings... offend those canons of
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-
speaking peoples"' 39 has largely been supplanted by more inflexi-
ble rules, such as that requiring counsel for all accused of a felony.140
Moreover, refusal of pretrial discovery, such as refusal to appoint de-
fense counsel, often leaves very subtle traces of prejudice; one usu-
ally cannot know what defense counsel might have done with fore-
knowledge of certain materials, just as one cannot tell what counsel
might have done for defendant if one had been appointed.14' An
inflexible rule in both cases has the grace of relieving the reviewing
court of asking the question.
The history of pretrial criminal discovery before the Supreme
Court has been rather sparse. In 1941 the Court held in Goldman
v. United States,142 a federal prosecution, that denial of pretrial dis-
covery of the notes and memoranda of certain government witnesses
was a proper exercise of discretion by the trial judge. Eleven years
later in Leland v. Oregon143 the Court held that denial of pretrial
inspection of the defendant's confession did not violate due process.
The Court noted that its opinion was "buttressed" by the defendant's
failure to assign this ground as error in his motion for a new trial at
the state level. Also, the facts of Leland made it very difficult to
find prejudice from the refusal of pretrial inspection; the confession
had been produced at trial by the prosecution 5 days before the de-
fendant rested his case, and the trial judge had asked the defendant's
attorney if he desired more time to study the confession, which was
refused. Leland was followed by Cicenia v. Lagay, 44 another case
involving denial of pretrial inspection of a confession. In Cicenia,
however, the prejudice was more apparent:
In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 801-2, this Court held that in the
absence of a showing of prejudice to the defendant it was not a
violation of due process for a state to deny counsel an opportunity
before trial to inspect his client's confession. It is true that in Leland,
the confession was made available to the defense at the trial several
days before its case was rested, whereas here petitioner pleaded non
vult without an opportunity to see the confession. We think that the
139 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
140 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
141 For an example of the difficulty of showing prejudice to a reviewing
court from denial of discovery, see Application of Tune, 230 F.2d 883 (3d Cir.
1956), where the court, assuming that denial of pretrial inspection of a con-
fession could violate due process, held that there was no prejudice because
the defendant would not allege any portions of his confession which were
inaccurate.
142 316 U.S. 129 (1941).
143 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
144 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
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principle of that case is nonetheless applicable. As we said in Leland
[343 U.S. at 801], although it may be the "better practice" for the
prosecution to comply with a request for inspection, we cannot say
that the discretionary refusal of the trial judge to permit inspection
in this case offended the Fourteenth Amendment. 145
That series of decisions following the famous Jencks litigation1 46
also impliedly held that pretrial discovery, at least of witnesses' state-
ments, is not constitutionally required. The Jencks decision itself
held that pretrial statements of government witnesses had to be
made available to defense counsel after the testimony of that wit-
ness had been completed on direct examination so that counsel could
impeach the witness if possible.147 From fear of possible dangers to
witnesses and the successful prosecution of crime arising out of a
broad reading of that opinion, 48 Congress immediately enacted the
Jencks Act, 49 subsection (a) of which provides:
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no
statement or report in the possession of the United States which was
made by a government witness or prospective government witness
(other than the defendant) to an agent of the government shall be the
subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has tes-
tified on the direct examination in the trial of the case.
The statute's constitutionality was attacked by the petitioner' 50 in
Palermo v. United States,'5 ' but the court more or less assumed its
constitutionality, dealing with the problem only in a footnote. 52 The
Court also gave brief reference to the point in Scales v. United
'45 Id. at 510-11. It has been argued that these cases lack strong prece-
dential value because of the lack of prejudice and because the issue of dis-
covery was subsidiary to the more famous aspects of each case: in Goldman,
bugging allegedly in violation of the fourth amendment; in Leland, the con-
stitutionality of insanity statutes which place the burden of proof on that
issue on the defendant; and in Cicenia, the right to counsel. See Comment,
The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74
YALE L.J. 136, 149 n.62 (1964); Inker & Oteri, supra note 100.
146 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
147 There is some doubt as to whether even this holding is on constitu-
tional grounds. The majority in Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959),
per Frankfurter, J., apparently thought not, which led to the concurring
opinion of Justice Brennan which stated that "it would be idle to say that the
commands of the constitution were not close to the surface of the decision."
Id. at 362-63. State courts have unanimously held that the Jencks decision,
not resting on due process grounds, cannot bind them. Sanders v. State, 278
Ala. 453, 179 So. 2d 35 (1965); State v. Pikul, 150 Conn. 195, 187 A.2d 422
(1962); Anderson v. State, 239 Ind. 372, 156 N.E.2d 384 (1959); McKenzie v.
State, 236 Md. 597, 204 A.2d 678 (1964); State v. Mobley, 369 S.W.2d 807 (Mo.
1964); State v. Robinson, 61 Wash. 2d 107, 377 P.2d 248, cert. denied, 375 U.S.
846 (1962).
148 H.R. REP. No. 700, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S. REP. No. 981, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
149 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964).
150 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Brief for Petitioner at 19, 20, 360
U.S. 343 (1959).
151 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
152 360 U.S. at 353 n.11.
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States,1 38 again upholding the statute.
The third line of decisions relevant to any constitutional right
to discovery in criminal cases is that headed by Brady v. Maryland,15 4
which cases involved suppression of evidence favorable to an accused
by the prosecutor.155 In Brady defense counsel had sought to exam-
ine before the trial statements made by a coconspirator in the crime
for which the defendant was charged. The prosecutor furnished sev-
eral statements but withheld one in which the coconspirator admitted
doing the actual killing. The jury, ignorant of this fact, sentenced
the defendant to death, when it might have recommended a lesser
penalty under Maryland law. Since the defendant would still be
guilty of murder by virtue of the felony-murder rule, the Maryland
Court of Appeals reversed only on the issue of punishment, and the
United States Supreme Court affirmed that reversal, stating in broad
language:
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence fa-
vorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the
good or bad faith of the prosecution.16
Justice White concurred:
I would employ more confining language and would not cast in con-
stitutional form a broad rule of criminal discovery. Instead, I would
leave this task, at least for now, to the rule-making or legislative
process after full consideration by legislature, bench, and bar.157
It has been argued that the Brady line of decisions has in effect
established "in constitutional form a broad rule of criminal discov-
ery."'158 The notion is essentially that Brady and several lower
court decisions8 9 have emphasized the need for preparation of de-
153 367 U.S. 203, 256-57 (1961).
'54 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
155 The early cases involved either knowing use of perjured testimony or
actual encouragement or coercion of perjury by the prosecution. Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 213 (1935); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). Prosecu-
tors were later held to a duty to correct, or allow defense counsel to correct,
errors known to be present in the state's evidence, Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S.
264 (1959), and to give notice to defendant of any exculpatory evidence he
(the prosecutor) knows to exist. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957). See
also the dissent in Durly v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 285 (1956).
156 373 U.S. at 87.
157 Id. at 92.
158 The most thorough treatment of this subject appears in Comment,
The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74
YALE L.J. 136 (1964). See also Comment, The Need for Liberalized Rules of
Discovery in Criminal Procedure, 49 MARQ. L. Ray. 736, 740-42 (1966); Inker
& Oteri, supra note 100. For an interesting analysis of the degree to which
these prosecutor suppression decisions should affect the Jencks Act and dis-
covery of witnesses' statements, see Wexler, The Constitutional Disclosure
Duty and the Jencks Act, 40 ST. Jon's L. REv. 206 (1966).
'59 Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963); United States ex rel.
Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Butler v.
Maroney, 319 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1963).
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fense counsel, and deemphasized the punishment of the prosecutor
for his misdeeds as the rationale for holding suppression of evidence
unconstitutional. Defense counsel, the argument continues, may be
equally ill-informed from lack of pretrial inspection of the evidence
the prosecutor does intend to present at trial as from ignorance of
that which the prosecutor does not intend to use. However, the latter
assumption seems questionable. In the suppression cases the prosecu-
tor does not reveal evidence he knows might exculpate the accused,
and the jury makes its deliberations ignorant of this evidence; where-
as in the case where pretrial inspection is denied, the evidence of
which discovery is denied will be seen by the jury and defense coun-
sel, and a trial will not have been had without all known, relevant
evidence being before the jury. Of course, pretrial discovery may
lead to further relevant, exculpatory evidence which both defense
counsel and prosecutor were ignorant of, but that is only a possibility
and not a certainty as in the suppression cases. Thus, while this
article is premised on the assumption that a defendant is preju-
diced by denial of pretrial inspection generally, it is probably true
that in most cases such prejudice is not as great or as obvious as
when exculpatory evidence is concealed. 160
A second distinction between the prosecutor suppression cases and
denial of pretrial discovery is that in the former there is little justifi-
cation for the prosecutor ignoring the dual function of his office:
to prosecute, but also to obtain only just convictions. Consequently,
when he does so abuse his office, a lesser showing of prejudice ought
to be required for reversal.161 Judge Friendly made this distinction
explicit in Kyle v. United States:162
The reason why the showing of prejudice required to bring down the
balance in favor of a new trial will vary from case to case is that
the pans contain weights and counterweights other than the interest in
a perfect trial. Sometimes only a small showing of prejudice, or none,
is demanded because that interest is reinforced by the necessity
160 See Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.
U.L. REV. 228, 242 n.77 (1964): "Since only the complete denial of discovery
would appear to present questions of constitutional stature, there probably
is no constitutional right to pre-trial discovery; discovery at trial coupled
with a continuance if necessary would probably be adequate to meet consti-
tutional requirements."
161 The language of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), quoted in
text accompanying note 156 supra, about good or bad faith of the prosecutor
being irrelevant seems unnecessary to the decision in that case, for no pros-
ecutor who gives that kind of misleading, partial disclosure could be acting
in good faith. To the extent that language is taken as authority, it does seem
to obliterate this second distinction.
102 297 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1961). Judge Palmieri also drew this distinction
in refusing to interpret the Brady decision as providing a vehicle for pretrial
discovery. United States v. Brush Co., 38 F.R.D. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("The
Principles of Fair Play in the Conduct of Criminal Prosecution Do Not Sup-
ply Defendants with a Basis for Pre-Trial Discovery.").
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that 'The administration of justice must not only be above reproach,
it must also be beyond the suspicion of reproach,' and by the
teachings of experience that mere admonitions are insufficient to pre-
vent repetitions of abuse.163
If a constitutional right to pretrial discovery is not an a fortiori
application of Brady v. Maryland, the question remains whether dis-
covery in criminal cases ought to be premised nevertheless in con-
stitutional terms. Doing so certainly has the advantage of an imme-
diate, uniform extension of discovery rights to those charged with
crime in many states where such rights are currently nonexistent.
164
To be balanced against that factor are two considerations. First, the
linking together of discovery by each side by means of a conditional
discovery order would be precluded by a constitutional grounding of
one part of that order; one could hardly condition a constitutional
right, particularly when the condition imposed may itself have
constitutional difficulties. Conditional discovery orders possess the
two-fold effect of allowing discovery against a defendant that might
otherwise be barred by the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination,16 5 and of preventing perjury by the defendant since he
may be "pinned down" to one story by what the prosecution discovers
via its part of the two-way order.166 These considerations apparently
led the California Supreme Court, which had originally couched its
decisions granting discovery to defendants in terms of fundamental
fairness and fair trial, 167 to backtrack somewhat when the implica-
tions of such language for discovery against the defendant was under
consideration:
It is contended.., that the cases permitting discovery by defendants
are not based on the power of the court to develop rules of pro-
cedure, but on the constitutional mandate that defendants be given a
fair trial .... Pretrial discovery in favor of defendants, however, is
not required by due process. Accordingly, when this court permitted
discovery in advance as well as at the trial, it was not acting under
constitutional compulsion but to promote the orderly ascertainment
of the truth.168
163 297 F.2d at 514 (citations omitted). See also Comment, The Duty of
the Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 60 COLUm. L. REV. 858, 864
(1960): "It is possible that the confusion about the necessity of showing
prejudice results from the possibility that the courts may not be using preju-
dice in the sense of injury to the defendant's interest, but rather are attempt-
ing to determine, without always saying so, the point at which the conduct
of the prosecutor becomes so offensive to our traditional sense of justice that
it fails to achieve the minimum standard that is requisite to a fair trial."
164 See text accompanying notes 10-42 supra.
165 See text accompanying notes 234-69 infra.
166 See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
167 Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 346 P.2d 407 (1959).
168 Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 59-60, 377 P.2d 919, 921, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 879, 881 (1962); see notes 192-203 infra. The discovery order under
attack in Jones was not a conditional discovery order, but rather a separate
order allowing discovery against the defendant. An appellate division, how-
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The second major reason for not granting discovery as a matter
of constitutional right is that to do so would preclude the kind of
legislative choices considered earlier in attempting to minimize abuses.
Constitutional rights are rarely limited by the character and associa-
tions of the accused, his attorney, or by considerations of prosecutorial
administration. 169
II.
Discovery by the Prosecution
Fifih Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Documents as Testimonial Utterances
It has long been assumed170 that ordering pretrial discovery
against a criminal defendant would violate his privilege against
self-incrimination, 171 recently made applicable to state criminal pro-
ceedings by Malloy v. Hogan.172 Considerable commentary,173 largely
ever, had allowed a conditional order to stand the year before. McCain v.
Superior Court, 184 Cal. App. 2d 813, 7 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1961).
169 The suggestion was made above at text accompanying notes 100-16
that defendants should have a right to discover confessions and certain phys-
ical evidence. It might be thought that whether this limited right is statutor-
ily or constitutionally required should make little difference. However, in-
sofar as it is thought desirable to attach prosecutorial discovery as a condition
on discovery of these items (see text accompanying note 265 infra), it makes
a considerable difference. Moreover, the distinctions drawn between con-
fessions and evidence recording the crime, and all other evidence, are prob-
ably not of constitutional dimensions, although the Louisiana court, the only
one to ground any discovery in the Constitution, has made just such a dis-
tinction. See note 41 supra.
170 See, e.g., the summary reversal of pretrial discovery of correspondence
between alleged coconspirators in Lancanshire v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 218
Mich. 16, 20, 187 N.W. 319, 320 (1922): "Plaintiff cannot be required to pro-
duce evidence tending to establish his guilt." See also the dicta in State v.
Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953), and State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397,
91 N.E. 186 (1910), where the courts rely on this assumption to deny discovery
to the defendants.
171 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself .
172 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
173 Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 228 (1964); Comment, The Self-Incrimination Privilege: Barrier to Crim-
inal Discovery?, 51 CALIr. L. REv. 135 (1963); Note, Criminal Procedure-
Discovery-Right of Prosecution to Pre-trial Discovery, 61 MicH. L. REV. 987
(1963); Note, Prosecution Entitled to Discover Documents and Names of Wit-
nesses to be Relied upon by Accused in Support of the Affirmative Defense,
10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 937 (1963); Note, 35 COLo. L. REV. 290 (1963); Note, 76
HAv. L. REv. 838 (1963); Note, 8 ViLL. L. REV. 110 (1962). Less favorable to
discovery by the prosecution is Louisell, Criminal Discovery and Self-Incrim-
ination: Roger Traynor Confronts the Dilemma, 53 CALiF. L. REv. 89 (1965);
Note, Prosecution Entitled to Know Identity of Defendant's Witnesses and
Discover Documents to be Introduced in Support of Affirmative Defense, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 361 (1963); Comment, Criminal Procedure-Pretrial Discovery
March 1968] CRIMVINAL DISCOVERY
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
engendered by the leading California decision of Jones v. Superior
Court,1 74 and by the recent amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure,'78 has challenged that assumption and re-
opened a question long thought settled.
A series of Supreme Court decisions headed by Boyd v. United
States,1 76 have tangential relevance to this question, as they deal with
the power of the government in investigating crime to obtain evidence
from an accused which tends to show his guilt. The famous Boyd
decision was a proceeding in rem against 35 cases of plate glass
allegedly imported in violation of the revenue acts. The owners ap-
peared, and the trial judge, pursuant to a federal statute,177 ordered
them to produce the invoices for the glass. The Court reversed that
order, holding on both fourth and fifth amendment grounds that
"any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or
of his private papers to be used in evidence to convict him or to for-
feit his goods, is within the condemnation [of those amendments]."17s
A number of limitations have been attached to the broad pro-
scription of Boyd, the most important of which is that only evidence
of a testimonial nature cannot be compelled from an accused.17 9 The
production of documents in Boyd involved compelled testimonial ut-
terances of an individual because, according to Wigmore, implicit in
the act of production is the defendant's "assurance ... that the arti-
cles produced are the ones demanded."' 8 0  On the other hand, com-
pelling an accused to try on a blouse, and at the trial allowing testi-
mony of a witness that the blouse fit the accused, was held in Holt v.
United States,'8 ' not to violate the latter's privilege against self-in-
crimination, Holmes stating for the Court:
by Prosecution-Defendant's Witnesses and Documents Supporting an Affirm-
ative Defense, 49 IowA L. REv. 176 (1963); Note, California Creates Pretrial
Discovery for the Prosecutor, 15 STAx. L. REV. 700 (1963).
174 197 Cal. App. 2d 836, 372 P.2d 919, 17 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1962); see text
accompanying notes 191-203 infra.°
175 Fm. R. Cam. P. 16(c).
176 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See also the dicta in Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1921), and in United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452,
464-65 (1932).
177 Act of June 22, 1874, 18 Stat. 88, 187.
178 116 U.S. at 630.
179 8 J. WIGMORE, EViDENCE § 2263 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
180 Id. at § 2264. Justice Traynor questioned this assertion by way of
dictum in Jones: "When the prosecution has ample evidence of the existence,
identity, and authenticity of documents in the defendant's possession and thus
does not need to rely on his knowledge to locate and to identify them or on
his testimony to authenticate them, it may be that his implied admission
alone that the documents produced were those he was ordered to produce
would invoke too trivial a degree of incrimination to justify invoking the
privilege." Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 60, 372 P.2d 919, 921, 22
Cal. Rptr. 879, 881 (1962).
181 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
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[T]he prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal case to be a
witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclu-
sion of his body as evidence when it may be material. 82
The Court in its recent Schmerber v. California83 decision, quoting
Mr. Justice Holmes, held with four dissents that the compulsory tak-
ing of blood from an accused did not violate his fourth or fifth
amendment rights because it was not evidence of a "testimonial or
communicative nature."'184
Another limitation to the Boyd holding is that books and docu-
ments required to be kept by statute are treated as public records,
meaning that they are obtainable by compulsory process without
violating either the fourth or fifth amendments.185 A third qualifi-
cation is that the objects of which production is sought must be held
in a personal capacity by the individual involved. 86 Thus a labor
union representative holding papers potentially incriminating of him-
self as well as of the union can be forced to yield those papers to the
government in a grand jury investigation,18 7 as may a corporate rep-
resentative, 8 since neither hold these materials in their own "per-
sonal capacities."
Despite these exceptions allowing some use to be made of the
defendant himself in the investigation of the crime, the Boyd holding
would generally prohibit obtaining from a noncorporate defendant
evidence tending to establish his guilt. 8 9 What it does not prohibit,
however, is the possibility of the prosecutor obtaining pretrial
discovery of evidence which the defendant intends to present to es-
tablish his innocence. Inspection of that evidence, unless the de-
fendant has extremely incompetent defense counsel, would not be a
"seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence
against him .... 1 9 0 that the Court condemned in Boyd.
182 Id. at 252-53.
183 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
184 Id. at 761. The Court explicitly denied any blanket adoption of the
Wigmore formulation. Id. at 763 n.7. See also United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967) (police lineup procedures held not to violate the fifth amend-
ment); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting exemplars
held not to violate an accused's fifth amendment privilege). See generally
Comment, To What Extent Does the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Protect an Accused from Physical Disclosures?, 1 VM4D. L. REv. 243 (1947),
where numerous if somewhat dated state court cases are discussed.
185 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
186 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1943).
187 Id.
188 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1910).
189 It prohibits what in effect would be the reciprocal of the constitutional
disclosure duty of the prosecutor, to disclose to the defendant exculpatory
evidence. See text accompanying notes 154-63 supra.
190 116 U.S. at 633 (emphasis added).
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The California Approach
In Jones v. Superior Court,'19 the California Supreme Court ex-
plicitly drew the distinction made in the foregoing paragraph. In
that case the defendant was accused of rape; on the day set for
trial he moved for a continuance in order to collect evidence to dem-
onstrate his impotency. The motion was granted, and 4 days later
the district attorney moved for discovery of the names of physicians
subpoenaed to testify to the defendant's impotency, the names of all
physicians who had treated the defendant prior to trial, all doctors'
reports relating to his impotency, and all x-rays taken after the acci-
dent which had allegedly caused this condition. The trial court
granted the motion in full, and the court through Justice Traynor
modified the order to allow discovery of evidence and witnesses the
defendant intended to introduce or call in support of his defense of
impotency. That part of the order compelling the defendant to
disclose evidence or the names of witnesses that he did not intend to
use was nullified as violative of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.192
The Jones decision may be viewed in one of two ways: either
as permitting discovery by the prosecutor of evidence which the
defendant intends to use in support of an affirmative defense, or as
allowing discovery of all evidence the defendant intends to introduce
irrespective of particular defenses. The first of these interpreta-
tions gains support from Justice Traynor's reliance upon the "alibi
statutes" of some 14 states. Seven of these statutes require only that
notice be given the prosecutor if the defendant intends to rely upon
the defense of alibi. 93  The remainder require that, in addition, the
defendant must furnish the prosecutor with a list of witnesses he
intends to call to support his alibi. 9 4 The penalty for noncompli-
ance in both cases may be preclusion of all testimony save the de-
fendant's about the alibi. These statutes have not yet been chal-
lenged in federal courts, probably because only a few years have
191 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
192 The court reasoned that it would be presumed that the documents the
state sought to inspect were incriminatory of the defendant since "for the
very fact that the prosecution seeks it establishes that in the prosecution's
view it may be incriminatory." 58 Cal. 2d at 60, 372 P.2d at 921, 22 Cal. Rptr.
at 881.
193 IOWA CODE § 777.18 (1962); MmnN. STAT. § 630.14 (1961); Onio REv.
CODE ANN. § 2945.58 (Page 1964); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 585 (1961); S.D. CODE
§ 34.2801 (Supp. 1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-22-17 (1964); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, §§ 6561-62 (1959).
194 Aiz. R. Calm. P. 192(B) (1959); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 1631-33 (1956);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1341 (1964); MIcH. ComP. LAws §§ 768.20-.21 (Supp.
1956); N.J. RuLEs 3:5-9 (1958); N.Y. CODE Cnvt. P. § 295-1 (1958); Wis. STAT.
§ 955.07 (1961).
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passed since the Supreme Court held the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination applicable to state proceedings. 95 The
state courts have unanimously upheld them against attack as violative
of state-created self-incrimination privileges.196 Justice Traynor also
relied upon the insanity defense statutes in many states which re-
quire that the defense of insanity must be specially pleaded. 197
These analogies are not compelling to explain even the first, more
limited interpretation of the Jones holding. The raising of either alibi
or insanity creates special needs that these defenses be disclosed to
the prosecutor pretrial. The insanity statutes deal with a defense
that alters the entire nature of the trial; they are designed to give
the prosecutor some notice that the trial will be oriented around this
quite different issue. Similarly, a particular need exists for dis-
closure of the alibi defense to the prosecutor because (1) that de-
fense is peculiarly suited to be sprung as a surprise, (2) it requires
no expert testimony to fabricate an alibi defense, 98 and (3) alleged
alibis may be more easily verified or disproven than many other
defenses.199 In addition, neither the insanity statutes nor the alibi
laws require a defendant to produce pretrial the evidence with
which he intends to support his case.
Despite this lack of authoritative precedent, pretrial disclosure
of evidence supporting an affirmative defense should not violate either
prong of the fifth amendment privilege-that of any person not to
incriminate himself, and that of an accused not to testify at all.
Since the evidence which is sought will undoubtedly tend to excul-
pate the defendant, the first part of the privilege should be satisfied.
195 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
196 The first three states to adopt alibi statutes were Michigan (1927),
Ohio (1929), and New York (1935). Since being upheld by decisions in two
of those states, State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio St. 1, 176 N.E. 656 (1931); Smetana
v. State, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 165, appeal dismissed, 131 Ohio St. 329, 2 N.E.2d 778
(1936); People v. Schade, 161 Misc. 212, 292 N.Y.S. 612 (Queens County Ct.
1936); People v. Rakiec, 260 App. Div. 452, 23 N.Y.S.2d 374, aff'd, 289 N.Y.
306, 45 N.E.2d 374 (1952), comparable statutes in the other states have seemed
to have gone unchallenged. See, e.g., State v. Kopacka, 261 Wis. 70, 51 N.W.2d
495 (1952), where the court more or less assumes the law is constitutional.
197 See H. WEIFEOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRImINAL DEFENSE 357-59
(1954), which notes the 17 jurisdictions with these statutes.
198 The alibi statutes were widely proclaimed at the time of their adop-
tions as reducing perjured alibi defenses. See Etsch, Ohio's New Alibi Defense
Law, 9 PANEL 42 (1931); Toy, 9 PANEL 52 (1931).
Proposed federal rule 12A, an alibi notice provision, was included in the
1962 draft of the new rules, 31 F.R.D. 673 (1963), but was deleted in the 1964
draft.
199 Note, Prosecution Entitled to Know Identity of Defendant's Witnesses
and Discover Documents to be Introduced in Support of Affirmative Defense,
63 COLum. L. REv. 361, 367 (1963); Note, California Creates Pretrial Discovery
for the Prosecutor, 15 STAN. L. REv. 700, 707 (1963); Note, 76 HAuV. L. REv.
838, 841 (1963).
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The second part might be expressed as a right in the accused to
stand mute until the prosecutor has presented his case-in-chief. Dis-
covery by the prosecutor, Justice Peters argued in dissent in Jones,
violates that right because it forces the defendant to show his hand
early, before the state has made out its prima facie case.200 One
answer to this is that evidence supporting an affirmative defense
should not be helpful to the prosecutor in making out his case-in-
chief, although admittedly it would be helpful in rebutting the de-
fense. Hence defendant's right to stand mute before the jury if he
so chooses is not impinged upon; if, after hearing the case against
him at trial, he thinks it unconvincing, he may still not raise the
defense at all. And since the disclosures compelled earlier related
only to the defense and thus did not aid the prosecutor in making out
his case, this decision at trial has not been foreclosed by any more
convincing proof by the prosecutor of his case.
The above argument in defense of prosecutorial discovery was
not made by the court in Jones, although Justice Peters apparently
thought that it had been. 201 Rather, the reasoning of the majority
refused to draw any distinction between evidence supporting an
affirmative defense and that supporting the defendant's case gen-
erally. It felt that the defendant's decision to stand mute or not was
only advanced in time by discovery, not abolished. He was only
being compelled to decide at an earlier stage in the proceedings with
what evidence he would use to defend himself. To the contention
that the defendant was forced to make this decision in ignorance of
the case against him, whereas at trial he would have heard all the
evidence against him, came the reply that, at least in California,20 2
the defendant could discover the entire case against him pretrial.
Thus the state of his knowledge would be roughly the same in the
earlier time period as at the trial.
This latter argument is the basis for interpreting Jones in the
broader sense referred to above, that discovery of all evidence an
accused intends to introduce does not violate his fifth amendment
privilege.203  Admittedly this interpretation allows the district at-
200 58 Cal. 2d at 62, 372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
201 Id.
202 Notes 37 and 125 supra.
203 The court did not have before it an attack upon the discovery order
as violating the fourth amendment, possibly because the defendant in Jones
did not believe doctor's reports would be classified as "private papers." But
even if they were so classified so as to fit the proscription of Boyd, the Cali-
fornia court's rationale answers that challenge as well. The state may be
compelling the production of private papers but is doing so only with those
which the defendant himself has decided will be produced at trial later any-
way. That decision by the defendant, which he has to make sometime, waives
his fourth amendment rights as well as his fifth amendment privilege.
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torney to make his case-in-chief more convincing because he can
anticipate the evidence which the defendant intends to use for re-
buttal. However, without discovery the government would have the
opportunity at trial to rebut the defendant's evidence anyway; the
only difference between that rebuttal and the anticipatory "rebuttal"
made possible by pretrial discovery is the surprise element the de-
fendant would have in the one situation but not in the other. A right
to surprise the prosecution hardly seems worthy of constitutional
sanctity.
The Washington Approach
The Supreme Court of Washington, apparently the only other
court to deal with this problem in recent years, 20 4 has also allowed
discovery against an accused, but has based it upon a wholly differ-
ent rationale than the California court. In State ex rel. Sowers v.
Olwell,20 5 a murder defendant's attorney had obtained the knife
allegedly used by his client in the killing; he had found the knife
from the information given him by his client. The attorney was
served with a subpoena duces tecum to appear with the knife at the
coroner's inquest. He refused to do so, asserting his client's fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Adjudged in con-
tempt, he appealed, and the Washington court held that he could not
assert the privilege of his client. One year later, in State v. Grove,20 6
another murder case, the trial court compelled the production of a
letter written by the accused to his wife in which he described his
version of the death of his mother-in-law. In affirming the produc-
tion order, the court dealt largely with the husband-wife and attor-
ney-client privileges; the court assumed without citation that the
order did not violate the fifth amendment privilege..20 7
From these decisions it would seem that the prosecution could
compel the production of anything relevant to the crime charged, so
long as the materials were in the hands of defense counsel and not
the defendant himself. Such a result seems completely untenable.
As Wigmore recognizes, the attorney is but the client's agent..20 8 As
204 See Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 1224 (1964), which lists only Jones and a few
cases under FED. R. CRnvr. P. 17 (c) (subpoena duces tecum) allowing discovery
against corporate defendants.
205 64 Wash. 2d 828, 394 P.2d 681 (1964).
206 65 Wash. 2d 525, 398 P.2d 170 (1965).
207 In dealing with the attorney-client privilege in the case the court did
cite Jones, but only for the general language about the defendant having nar
valid interest in opposing discovery. Id. at 530, 398 P.2d at 173. No mention
was made of the distinction drawn in Jones between evidence the defendant
intends to introduce and all other materials he might have in his possession
relevant to the case.
208 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2270, 2307 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
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long as the defendant himself could not be compelled to produce the
evidence, it is difficult to see how the court's reasoning that "the
attorney should not be a depository for the suppression of such
criminal evidence," 209 has any relevance: the fifth amendment al-
ready sets up one such "depository" in the accused. A ruling that
once the accused transfers evidence to his attorney he thereby re-
moves it from that sanctuary can only encourage a kind of hide-and-
seek game on the part of the defendant, his attorney, and the prose-
cutor, and may well discourage the preparation of defense counsel
because of inadequate opportunity to familiarize himself with the
evidence.
The Supreme Court has never passed on standing to assert the
fifth amendment in these circumstances. 210 The cases cited by the
Washington court in Olwel--United States v. White,211 and Hate v.
Henke121 2-both dealt with the standing of a corporate or union offi-
cer to raise the privilege of self-incrimination for himself when the
documents of which production was sought were the property of the
corporation or union. The Court in that context said that the papers
or documents had to be held in a "personal capacity" in order for the
individuals to be in a position to assert their own privileges.213  To
use that language in the context of an accused and his counsel is
fallacious, because the union or corporation had no privilege which
could have been asserted by its officers or agents, whereas an in-
dividual accused does.2 14  The Ninth Circuit in a fully considered
opinion distinguished these cases in this manner, and held that de-
fense counsel may assert the privilege of his client to prevent the
compulsory disclosure of the latter's papers.215 The First 216 and Sec-
209 State ex rel. Sowers v. Qiwell, 64 Wash. 2d 823, 836, 394 P.2d 681,
686 (1964).
210 In Grant v. United States, 277 U.S. 74 (1913), an attorney was held
in contempt for failure to produce the books of his client who was under
indictment by a grand jury. The Court recognized the problem of standing
of the attorney to assert his client's privilege, but bypassed the question by
holding that the books were really the property of a corporation which had
no privilege to be asserted; this, despite the fact that the corporation had
been dissolved 2 years prior to the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum,
and that the client had been the sole stockholder.
211 322 U.S. 694 (1943).
212 201 U.S. 43 (1905).
213 See text accompanying notes 186-88 supra.
214 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
215 United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963). The editors of
a student note on the case, Note, The Attorney and His Client's Privileges,
74 YALE L.J. 539 (1964), do not find it anomalous to refuse standing to an
attorney to assert his client's fifth amendment privilege because the attorney-
client privilege should prohibit production of the client's papers. However,(1) the attorney-client privilege does not protect preexisting documents (note
227 infra), and (2) even if it did, it is curious to say that one has not a con-
stitutional right because he already has statutory protection.
216 Brody v. United States, 243 F.2d 378, 387 (1st Cir, 1957).
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ond217 Circuits have also recognized an attorney's standing to assert
his client's self-incrimination privilege, although the Eighth218 and
Sixth219 appear to have taken a contrary position.
Owell dealt with production of evidence which the accused had
given to his attorney. If the holding of that case is rejected, as it
should be, it does not necessarily follow that all materials in the
possession of a defense attorney are secured from discovery by the
client's fifth amendment privilege. Those which the attorney him-
self prepared or those which he obtained from third parties might at
first blush seem distinguishable. The circumlocution of the privilege
is not so bald if production were compelled in these latter situations:
the client has not "walked into his attorney's office . ..with the
Amendment's protection, and walked out with something less,"
which is what the court found so appalling in Judson.220 Also, it
could be argued that evidence originally in the hands of third par-
ties would be obtainable by the prosecution absent its transfer to
the attorney, and thus there might be some danger of the attorney
becoming a "depository" for incriminating evidence. On the other
hand, the attorney would only be allowed to keep safe from disclosure
what the defendant himself could conceal if he were conducting his
own defense. A defendant who took witnesses' statements on his
own, or who secured evidence from third parties, could not be com-
pelled to produce them as long as they were in his rightful posses-
sion.221 Why should any different consequences flow from a situa-
tion where the defendant has counsel preparing his defense? To say
that they do only penalizes the utilization of the constitutional right
to counsel.3
217 Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 951 (1963).
218 Bouscher v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963).
219 United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1964).
220 322 F.2d 460, 466 (9th Cir. 1963).
221 Actual ownership is not essential to the assertion of the privilege, as
long as there is rightful possession in a 'personal capacity" by the privilege
holder. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1943) (dictum); In re Applica-
tion of Daniels, 140 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); noted in 10 VAM. L. REv.
147 (1956). The rationale for drawing the line at possession would appear to
be that a third party entitled to possession could replevy the materials from
an accused, and then hand them over to the government, whereas when the
latter is entitled to possession, that is not true. Thus the knife in Owell
may have belonged to another person, and could be compelled from the ac-
cused himself, to say nothing of his attorney. This possibility was not con-
sidered by the court.
222 If evidence in the hands of defense counsel is producible if obtained
from third parties, but not otherwise, then the defendant has the same in-
centive mentioned earlier to put this evidence in his own possession, thus
making it nondiscoverable. Hindrance of the preparation of the defense
would go on, and the same kind of hide-and-seek maneuvering would con-
tinue: the attorney, needing the documents to prepare his defense, would
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For these reasons, discovery of the defendant's case should not
be constitutionally justified by artificial distinctions based on wheth-
er the attorney or the client is in possession of the materials of
which discovery is sought, or whether the attorney or the client was
first to obtain possession of the materials. Such justification would
make for very haphazard discovery rights in the prosecution. The
rationale of the California court on the other hand, when taken at its
fullest implications, provides a consistent if limited basis for dis-
covery by the state. Even if the policy of the fifth amendment is
the broader one of forcing the state to seek out evidence against an
accused through independent investigative techniques,223 the Cal-
ifornia view is consistent with that policy, in that the evidence the
government will obtain will not be evidence it can use to convict
the defendant.224
Assuming that the Washington approach is rejected while that
of California is not, discovery by the government of witness lists, or
of tangible or documentary evidence which the accused intends to
introduce, would be permissible under the fifth amendment. What
would not be obtainable by the government would be such items as
pretrial statements of the defendant's witnesses, scientific reports the
defendant's experts have prepared which will not be offered into
evidence, and any other items that are either not admissible as evi-
dence or that the defendant does not intend to introduce into evi-
dence. And of course, discovery of any statements of the defendant
himself, or the deposing of the defendant, would be out of the
question.225 Whether broader discovery can be had against the de-
take them out of the sanctuary of defendant's presence for short periods of
time and the prosecutor would attempt to anticipate those periods and have
a discovery order ready.
223 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The majority opinion in
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), however, recognizes that this
policy may sometimes go beyond the actual prohibitions of the fifth amend-
ment.
224 Whether even the California view will be accepted by the Supreme
Court is open to question. The new federal rule 16 (c) allows discovery by
the prosecution to the same extent the Jones court did, that is, of all evidence
the accused intends to introduce. Professor Wright terms this a "real bomb-
shell." Wright, supra note 126, at 327.
Justices Douglas and Black dissented from the transmittal of the rules
to Congress for a number of reasons, among which was the following:
"[S]ome of the proposed criminal rules go to the very borderline, if they
do not actually transgress, the constitutional right of a defendant not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself. This phase of the criminal rules
in itself so infects the whole collection of proposals that, without mentioning
other objections, I am opposed to transmittal of the proposed amendments
to the criminal rules." Statement of Mr. Justice Black, 39 F.R.D. 272 (1966).
Mr. Douglas's statement appears id. at 276, and is quoted in text accompanying
note 240 infra.
225 E.g., Lander v. State, 238 Ind. 680, 154 N.E.2d 507 (1958) (dictum).
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fendant by inducing him to waive his fifth amendment privilege in
exchange for discovery rights himself will be discussed below.
Atiorney-Clieni Privilege
The privilege of the client to the secrecy of his communications
with his attorney is given scant attention here, because being a crea-
ture of nonconstitutional origins,226 it can be modified to allow dis-
covery by the government should that be thought necessary. As a
general rule, it seems that modification of the privilege would not
be necessary because most discovery could be permitted within the
privilege as currently interpreted.
The privilege protects confidential communications made by a
client to his attorney in an existing attorney-client relationship.
Almost all evidence, either tangible objects, papers, documents, or
other real evidence, given the attorney by an accused would not be
protected by the privilege from discovery, because that evidence
would have been preexisting at the time of the formation of the
attorney-client relationship; thus the communication which might in-
here in a document (even if confidential) would have been made be-
fore the relationship was assumed, and the document's transferral to
the attorney is not a communication itself.227 A fortiori, any pre-
existing evidence the accused's attorney receives from third parties,
even if ultimately traceable to information given him by the accused,
would not be protected by the privilege.
Pretrial statements of witnesses taken by an attorney or his
agent, and almost all scientific reports ordered by the attorney, are
not privileged because they are not made by the client to his attorney
but rather come from third parties. 228 An exception is made for
226 Some basic applications of the privilege might be included in the sixth
amendment right to counsel. Cf. Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C.
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952) (right to counsel includes right
to private consultation).
227 Grant v. United States, 277 U.S. 74 (1913); United States v. Judson,
322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d
734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953) (dictum); Bauer v. Orsner,
258 F. Supp. 338 (D.N.D. 1966); 8 J. WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2307 (McNaughton
rev. 1961). The rationale for the rule is that stated by the Olwell court:
that the accused's attorney could become a depository for incriminating evi-
dence. 64 Wash. 2d at 833, 394 P.2d at 684. Interestingly enough, the Olwell
court held, contrary to the above authorities, that the knife in the attorney's
possession in that case was protected from production by the attorney-client
privilege; the court went on to render that holding meaningless by imposing
on the attorney, as an officer of the court, the duty to voluntarily turn over
the evidence to the prosecutor, after "a reasonable period" for his own in-
spection. Id. at 833-34, 394 P.2d at 634-86.
228 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947): "[tlhe protective cloak
of this privilege does not extend to information which an attorney secures
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reports of physical or mental examinations of the defendant ordered
by the attorney, for "such reports are communications from ...
[the defendant] to his attorney through such physicians.1229
In similar fashion, witness lists are not protected from discovery,
for while the defendant is often likely to be the original source for
identifying potential witnesses, knowledge that such persons will in
fact be witnesses at the trial originates with the attorney and hence
is not a communication from the client.
Aside from reports of examinations of the defendant, the only
other items the attorney-client privilege would seem to protect from
discovery are written or oral statements made by the defendant and
intended only for his attorney.230 But then, these items, plus perhaps
the defendant-physician-attorney communications, are all the pol-
icy of the privilege extends to anyway. Encouragement of full dis-
closure by client to counsel is not accomplished by forbidding dis-
covery of third party statements, reports, or other evidence not pre-
pared for communication by the defendant to the attorney; that




The 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
added a new subsection (c) to the discovery rule, rule 16. Subsection
(c) reads in part as follows:
(c) Discovery by the Government. If the court grants . . . [dis-
covery by the defendant of anything but confessions or the defend-
ant's own grand jury testimony], it may, upon motion by the govern-
ment, condition its order by requiring that the defendant permit the
government to inspect and copy or photograph scientific or medical
reports, books, papers, documents, tangible objects, or copies or por-
tions thereof, which the defendant intends to produce at trial ....
The originally proposed rule contained an alternative formulation for
this subsection, which simply would have allowed discovery by the
prosecution without conditioning discovery by the defendant. 23 1 Ap-
... while acting for his client .... ." Humphries v. Pennsylvania R.R., 14
F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1953) (discovery of "statements and accident reports
of defendant's employees, crew members, and witnesses" not privileged in a
civil action).
229 Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 61, 372 P.2d 919, 921-22, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 879 (1962); see 8 J. WIGmoRE, EviDENcE §§ 2317-18 (McNaughton rev.
1961).
230 See State v. Grove, 65 Wash. 2d 525, 398 P.2d 170 (1965), where the
written communication was held not to be confidential because the defendant
had known that it would be inspected by the prison authorities before mailing.
231 The proposed rules as of 1964 may be found in Fontana, Discovery in
Criminal Cases-A Survey of the Proposed Rule Changes, 25 MD. L. REv. 212
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parently, however, the Advisory Committee on the Rules decided to
take the constitutionally safer course, and place discovery on a con-
ditional basis so that if challenged, the rule could be sustained on a
"waiver" theory as well as on strict fifth amendment analysis.232
As noted earlier, 233 the extent of discovery allowed by rule 16(c)
should not be held violative of an accused's fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination. The following discussion assumes,
however, that that analysis might be rejected or that discovery
against the defendant beyond that allowed by the fifth amendment
might be desired. The question thus discussed here is whether dis-
covery against a defendant, though violative of the fifth amendment
if required alone, can nonetheless be obtained by inducing the de-
fendant to waive his fifth amendment privilege in order to obtain
discovery himself.
There is little authority of any kind on the constitutionality of a
waiver argument in the context of mutual discovery. A number of
commentators proposed this idea prior to the formulation of the new
Federal Rules, 234 and at least one state court has adopted the notion
as a basis for mutual discovery without statutory direction. 235 The
State of Washington has a unique statute which requires an ex-
change of witness lists. 236 The statute was early upheld from consti-
tutional attack, the court construing it to preclude the introduction of
testimony of witnesses only if unlisted without good cause.237 An-
other statute relevant by analogy is that of Indiana, which allows a
defendant to take depositions of witnesses and introduce them at
trial, on condition that the accused waive his right to confront wit-
nesses "relative to the same matter.1238
The authority most in point is the dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas
(1965), and in Nederud, The Role of the Prosecutor in Criminal Procedure,
32 U. Mo. K.C.L. REV. 142 (1964).
232 For purposes of terminology, conditional discovery is herein described
as a waiver theory. It deserves mention, however, that the Jones rationale
is itself constructed upon a theory of waiver by an accused of his right to
stand silent, because it relies upon a waiver of that right at trial to justify
an earlier waiver pretrial. See note 203 supra.
233 See text accompanying notes 170-225 supra.
234 Comment, The Self-Incrimination Privilege: Barrier to Criminal Dis-
covery?, 51 CALia. L. REv. 135, 144 (1963); Goldstein, supra note 55, at 1197-98;
Nederud, supra note 231, at 160; Note, Criminal Law-Discovery in Criminal
Cases, 18 VAND. L. REV. 1640, 1646 (1965).
236 McCain v. Superior Ct., 184 Cal. App. 2d 813, 7 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1960).
See also State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965), where the court
instructed the trial judge that he might condition the granting of defendant's
motion to inspect the state's psychiatrists' reports upon the defendant allowing
inspection of his reports.
236 WAsH. REV. CODE § 10.37.030 (1961).
237 State v. Sickles, 144 Wash. 236, 257 P. 385 (1927).
238 IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1610 (1956).
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to the transmittal of the new rules to Congress. While purporting
only to suggest the problem, there should be little doubt as to how
he and Justice Black 239 would view this conditional discovery argu-
ment:
The prosecution's opportunity to discover evidence in possession of
the defense is somewhat limited in the proposal with which we deal
in that it is tied to the exercise by the defense of the right to dis-
cover from the prosecution. But if discovery by itself, of information
in the possession of the defendant would violate the privilege against
self-incrimination, is it any less of a violation if conditioned on the
defendant's exercise of the opportunity to discover evidence? May
benefits be conditioned on the abandonment of constitutional rights?
[citing Scherbert v. Verner, discussed infra]. To deny a defendant
the opportunity to discovery-an opportunity not withheld from de-
fendants who agree to prosecutorial discovery or from whom dis-
covery is not sought-merely because the defendant chooses to exer-
cise the constitutional right to refrain from self-incrimination argu-
ably imposes a penalty upon the exercise of that fundamental privi-
lege.240
The easy answer to the above argument would be something like
the following: the defendant is not compelled to be a witness against
himself by a "waiver" statute, "since it gives the defendant the choice
of either retaining the full force of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination or of invoking the full use of discovery
machinery. '24 1 To retain the privilege, he need only reject the prof-
fered benefit, discovery of the prosecutor's case. Essentially the same
argument in different verbal garb is that the greater power of with-
holding discovery from a defendant of the case against him must in-
clude the lesser power of conferring the benefit (of discovery) with a
condition (waiver of the fifth amendment) attached.242
This argument has an easy appeal to it that has made the condi-
tioning of benefits upon the waiver of rights a favorite technique of
state legislatures in impinging upon constitutional safeguards. 243 On
occasion the Supreme Court has accepted it. 244 However, in recent
decades the Court has recognized that it is unacceptable, for by its
239 Statement of Mr. Justice Black, 39 F.R.D. 272 (1966), quoted note 224
supra.
240 Statement of Mr. Justice Douglas, 39 F.R.D. 276, 277 (1966).
241 Note, Criminal Law-Discovery in Criminal Cases, 18 VAND. L. REV.
1640, 1646 (1965).
242 Of course, if the defendant had a constitutional right to discover the
case against him, this argument could have no force-one could hardly con-
dition the granting of one constitutional right (to discover) on the waiver of
another (to remain silent). As set forth earlier, however (text accompanying
notes 139-69 supra), the accused probably has no constitutional discovery
rights and therefore the legislatures arguably have the "greater power" to
withhold the benefit of discovery absolutely.
243 Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HAiv. L. REv. 1595 (1960).
244 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923): "the
powers of the State are not invaded, since the statute imposes no obligation
but simply extends an option which the State is free to accept or reject."
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broad terms many important liberties could be eroded away by the
simple expedient of withholding benefits unless these rights were
waived. For example, in Scherbert v. Verner,245 cited by Justice
Douglas in his dissent, a Seventh-Day Adventist was denied state
unemployment benefits because she had refused to accept positions
requiring her to work on Saturdays. To the contention that unem-
ployment compensation was a benefit the state did not have to ex-
tend to anyone, the Court replied: "It is too late in the day to doubt
that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the
denial of or placing condition upon a benefit or privilege.124
6
Of somewhat closer relevance is that line of decisions beginning
with Slochower v. Board of Education,247 where state employment was
terminated because the job-holder had refused to waive his fifth
amendment privilege. In Slochower itself, the petitioner had been a
college professor who, by operation of a New York statute, was re-
moved from his position because he had asserted his fifth amendment
privilege during the McCarthy Senate subcommittee hearings. The
Court quickly disposed of any argument that state employment was
a benefit the state could withhold as it pleased: "To state that a per-
son does not have a constitutional right to government employment
is only to say that he must comply with reasonable, lawful, and
nondiscriminatory terms laid down by the proper authorities. '248 The
Court proceeded to hold that the condition imposed-waiver of the
provilege against self-incrimination-bore no relation to the benefit
extended (employment as a college professor), and that therefore
the petitioner's dismissal was unconstitutional.
Subsequent cases, all decided by a majority of five Justices or by
an equally divided Court, have considerably diminished the holding
of Slochower.249 Whatever the force of the holding, the framework
for analysis of the Court in that case seems clearly correct. 250 The
question asked was whether "the granting of the benefit places the
recipient in a position which gives the government a legitimate in-
terest in restricting his rights."25 1 The benefit of state employment
arguably creates no dangers requiring that fifth amendment privi-
leges be given up, whereas granting criminal defendants the benefit
245 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
246 Id. at 404.
247 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
248 Id. at 555.
249 Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958) (public school teacher);
Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) (subway conductor); Cohen v. Hurley,
366 U.S. 117 (1961) (lawyer disbarred); Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362
U.S. 1 (1960) (permanently and part-time employed social workers).
250 Even the later decisions do not abandon the mode of analysis of
Slochower.
251 Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 lHARv. L. REv. 1595, 1600 (1960).
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of discovering the case against them quite possibly does.
A number of potential dangers were enumerated in some detail
earlier.2 52 To the extent to which these dangers can be minimized by
allowing discovery by the government, the inducement to an accused
to waive his fifth amendment privilege should be justified. Discovery
by the government would help to alleviate two and perhaps three of
these dangers. The danger of perjured defenses would be consider-
ably lessened by prosecutorial discovery, for two reasons. First, it
would help pin the defendant down to a story pretrial, so that later
he would be unable to fabricate new defenses.253 Second, if a de-
fendant realizes that the prosecution will have advance knowledge of
his defenses, he will be much less likely to raise perjured ones, be-
cause he will know that the prosecution will be able to investigate
them fully before trial.254
The second danger minimized by allowing discovery by the gov-
ernment is the danger that the prosecution would otherwise be open
to unfair surprise tactics by the defendant. Since granting discovery
rights to defendants eliminates much of the ability of the prosecutor
to surprise the defendant, there is a certain egalitarian notion that
suggests that a similar ability be stripped from the defendant.2 55
But more than that, undue surprise by the defendant simply has no
justification, while it does leave open the possibility of guilty criminals
being acquitted by pretrial maneuvering rather than by an informed
jury decision.256
Finally, the danger of prosecutors committing materials to mem-
ory would probably be lessened if they know that to do so would only
invite reciprocal action on the part of defense counsel.
If one finds these rather general arguments to be sufficient jus-
tification for the imposition of the condition of fifth amendment
waiver on discovery by a defendant, then two further questions
are raised: (1) To what extent must an accused waive his fifth
amendment privilege in order that these dangers are minimized?
(2) To the discovery of what kinds of evidence by the defendant
should this condition (of waiver) be attached? Constitutional justifi-
cation for a waiver statute such as Federal Rule 16(c) can go no
further than the answers to these two questions. That is, a complete
waiver of the self-incrimination privilege probably could not be justi-
252 See text accompanying notes 55-95 supra.
253 See text accompanying note 58 supra.
254 See text accompanying note 64 supra.
255 See Traynor, supra note 160 at 248: "[the defendant] can hardly de-
mand pre-trial discovery and still insist upon reserving his own surprises for
the trial. The good coin of discovery gains in value when it is exchanged at
the appropriate procedural hours."
256 See text accompanying notes 85-90 supra,
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fled because such a complete abandonment of the privilege is not
necessary to counteract the evils above suggested. In like fashion,
attaching prosecutorial discovery as a condition upon discovery by the
defendant of types of evidence which do not give rise to any of the
evils feared would be invalid on a waiver rationale. Each of these
factors is discussed below.
Extent of Waiver Necessary
The discovery allowed by Federal Rule 16(c)-of evidence the
accused intends to present-alleviates to a considerable extent the
relevant dangers indicated. Discovery of these materials gives the
prosecution sufficient information to investigate the defenses raised
and to check over all the evidence and witnesses used to support
those defenses; perjury would be deterred by knowledge of the de-
fendants that this will occur. Also, the extent of discovery in 16(c)
almost totally eliminates the danger of undue surprise of the prose-
cutor; after all, he can discover everything the defendant intends to
introduce well in advance of trial.257 There are, however, three ways
in which these dangers might justify a broader waiver by the accused
of his fifth amendment privilege.
First, the discovery allowed in 16(c) does not give the prosecutor
any way to pin down the defendant to one story, for obtaining from
the defendant notice of one set of defenses and the evidence to sup-
port them in no way precludes the later decision to raise new and
different defenses. Of course, with a continuing duty to disclose,
the prosecutor would have notice of these later defenses too, which
he could prepare to meet, but the only point here is that the first
disclosure usually would not foreclose a later, inconsistent set of de-
fenses. A pretrial deposition of the defendant would be needed for
that purpose.
Second, the surprise element is not totally eradicated because
the prosecutor will not have the pretrial statements of the defend-
ant's witnesses. Since the prosecutor commonly cannot take deposi-
tions of these witnesses, 2 8 he may well be surprised by their testi-
mony. The defendant, by way of contrast, has the right to depose
the state's witnesses, 25 9 and should besides have the opportunity to
257 This assumes that a continuing duty to disclose is imposed on the
defendant, so that he cannot surprise the prosecutor with a "changed intent."
Fmu. R. CRnm. P. 16 (g) imposes such a duty.
258 The advisory committee has twice proposed to the Supreme Court
that FED. R. Camw. P. 15 be changed to allow the prosecutor to take depositions,
but the Court has on both occasions rejected the proposal. Orfield, The Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 445, 449 (1966).
259 Note 119 supra.
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inspect their pretrial statements as well.260 Thus to some extent the
defendant will have the opportunity to surprise the prosecutor by
knowing exactly to what the latter's witnesses will testify, and by
planning the presentation of the undisclosed testimony of his own
witnesses accordingly.
Finally, the danger of memorization of materials by the prosecu-
tion arguably would not be diminished very much by the discovery
allowed in 16 (c) because the prosecutor would know that he would not
be able to obtain any materials which the defendant could commit
to memory anyway, and that therefore he (the prosecutor) need not
fear any reciprocal action on defendant's part if he commits to
memory reports, interviews, and the like.
It has been suggested that the accused, if he chooses to obtain
discovery of the case against him, should be compelled to waive his
status as an accused, retaining only a witness' privilege not to di-
rectly incriminate himself.261 It does not seem that the above dan-
gers justify a waiver to that extent. Of the three listed, only the
first-being able to pin down the defendant-requires such a waiver.
The second, the danger of some surprise, could be taken care of by
less objectionable means, viz, by allowing the prosecution to take
depositions of the defendant's witnesses; 262 the third is a rather minor
danger to begin with, and fear of prosecutorial abuse would be a
strange justification for curtailing the defendant's privilege. Conse-
quently, the extent of the waiver embodied in rule 16(c) is probably
the most that should be had. If a broader waiver seems desirable,
that is quite possibly due to disagreement with the basic doctrine of
Wigmore and of Boyd, that compelled production of documents vio-
lates the fifth amendment.
Discovery of Evidence to Which the Condition ShouZd Be Attached
If it could be shown that discovery of certain evidence by the
defendant did not give rise to any of the dangers, the minimization
of which have been used to justify imposing a fifth amendment waiver
as a condition on discovery by the defendant, then the attachment of
that condition to discovery of that evidence could not be sustained.
Some differentiation was made earlier between the dangers pre-
sented by certain classes of evidence. 263 Of the three dangers rele-
vant here-perjury, surprise, and memorization-only the latter can
260 See Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957); text
accompanying notes 118-20 supra.
261 See Scherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
262 There is no argument that deposing defendant's witnesses violates his
fifth amendment rights, because they as third parties have no standing to
assert his privilege. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
263 Text accompanying notes 100-22 supra.
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be said to vary in intensity with the type of evidence which the de-
fendant seeks to discover. Consequently, a condition of waiver to the
extent above described probably could be attached to discovery of
anything by the defendant.
Subsection (c) of the new Federal Rule 16, however, carefully
makes the distinction between discovery of the defendant's prior
statements and discovery of everything else, in that the former can-
not be conditioned on a waiver of the fifth amendment. This distinc-
tion must be based on one of two considerations-either the one re-
jected above, that discovery of defendant's statements presents less
danger of perjury or surprise than discovery of other evidence, or
that there is a greater need by defense counsel for discovery of con-
fessions and the like than for other materials. If the latter factor is
the rationale, then the distinction is a kind of legislative hedge against
the possibility that discovery of confessions might be constitutionally
required although the discovery of nothing else is. 264  Hence one
would not want to condition that discovery with the waiver of another
constitutional right.
265
264 See note 169 supra; text accompanying notes 143-45 supra.
265 FED. R. CRiV. P. 16 (c) thus maintains the course least open to consti-
tutional challenge: if attacked because it conditions a due process right in
defendants to discover the case against them, the answer is that the right
only extends to confessions, which are not conditioned; if attacked as violative
of the fifth amendment, the answers are that discovery against an accused
limited to evidence he intends to introduce does not violate the fifth amend-
ment, and that even if it did, the extent of the waiver induced is necessary
to prevent abuses from allowing him discovery.
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